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TAKINGS AND TRANSMISSION*
ALEXANDRA

B. KLASS**

Ever since the Supreme Court's controversial 2005 decision in
Kelo v. City of New London, courts, state legislatures, and the
public have scrutinized eminent domain actions like never
before. Such scrutiny has focused, for the most part,on the nowcontroversial "economic development" or "public purpose"
takings involved in Kelo. By contrast, until recently, there has
been little change in law orpublic opinion with regard to takings
involving publicly owned projects such as schools, post offices,
and other government buildings, or "use by the public" takings
that condemn land for railroadlines, electric transmission lines,
or other infrastructure projects. However, recent changes in
electricity markets and the development of the country's electric
transmission system have raisednew questions about the validity
of "use by the public" takings in the context of electric
transmissionlines. With some transmission lines now being built
by private "merchant" companies rather than by publicly
regulated utilities, and with the push to build more interstate
transmission lines to transport renewable energy to meet state
renewable portfolio standards,what was once a classicpublic use
is now subject to new statutory and constitutional challenges.
This Article explores the potential impact of these developments
on the use of eminent domain for electric transmission lines.
Ultimately, it suggests that states should ensure that their eminent
domain laws governing transmission lines are consistent with
their policy preferences surrounding energy development in the
state. This Article outlines some ways for states to accomplish
this goal.
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INTRODUCTION

After the United States Supreme Court decided the controversial
Kelo v. City of New London' case in 2005, Congress, state courts,
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

2013]

TAKINGS AND TRANSMISSION

1081

state legislatures, and the public began a heated debate over what
constitutes a "public use" for purposes of exercising eminent domain
authority. In Kelo, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld the ability of the City of New London, Connecticut, to take
private homes by eminent domain as part of a larger economic
development plan for the city,' which included a corporate
headquarters for a large pharmaceutical company.' In reaching the
decision, the Court held that economic development in the form of
attempting to create jobs and increase the tax base was a recognized
"public use" under the Fifth Amendment, 4 and thus, so long as "just
compensation" was paid, the taking was valid.' While the case
resulted in numerous statutory and constitutional reforms to state
eminent domain laws nationwide to protect private property rights,
those reforms focused primarily on the urban renewal, "economic
development" takings at issue in Kelo.6 Very few of these reforms
attempted to limit eminent domain authority for other types of
takings by governments and private actors.
This Article explores what has historically been a fairly noncontroversial taking: namely, actions by governments and, more
often, by utility companies or other electricity providers, to take
private property in order to build interstate transmission lines. These
takings, unlike the situation in Kelo, typically involve the government
or public utilities condemning or otherwise occupying property in
order to put it directly to public use, rather than to transfer it to a
private entity that will engage in an activity to benefit the public. But
is a transmission line always a public use? Many state statutes and
constitutions state expressly that it is, but what if the line is being built
by a private "merchant" transmission company' that is not a public
2. Id. at 472, 484. The City of New London delegated its eminent domain authority
for the development to the New London Development Corporation, id. at 475, a private
nonprofit corporation created to assist the city in planning economic development. Id. at
473.
3. See id. at 473.
4. Id. at 483-84.
5. See id. at 489-90; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that no "private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
6. See generally David Schultz, Economic Development and Eminent Domain After
Kelo: Property Rights and "Public Use" Under State Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENvTL.
OUTLOOK J. 41 (2006) (examining the various constitutional measures states took after
the Supreme Court's decision); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political
Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (analyzing the various responses state
legislatures took after the Kelo decision).
7. Private merchant transmission companies, unlike regulated public utilities or
independent transmission companies, generate revenue solely from contracts they sign
with electricity generators to transmit electricity over the merchant lines for delivery to
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utility? What if the line is being built to provide power solely to
customers in other states and will not provide any power to customers
in the state in which the eminent domain action must be filed? What
if the line is to provide power to a single, large, private customer or
provide market access to a single, large, private generator such as a
solar plant or wind farm? Should the power of eminent domain be
available for these projects or should the proposer of the project be
forced to negotiate with all property owners in the line's path to
obtain the necessary easements? Current lawsuits pending in
Montana and potential lawsuits in other states over transmission
lines, many of which are intended to facilitate the increased use of
wind, solar, and other renewable electricity sources throughout the
country, make this question more than just an intellectual exercise.'
To answer these questions, some background on eminent domain
and public use is helpful. There remains little debate that the
government can take private property and transfer it to public
ownership, such as taking private property to build a school, a road,
or a military base, so long as just compensation is paid.' There is also
a long history in United States jurisprudence and state and federal
statutes granting certain common carriers, public utilities, and other
private actors authority to take private property to create
infrastructure or other projects that will be used by the public so long
as they obtain government approval or the actions are designated as a
public use by statute.10 Somewhat more controversial is the ability of
mining and other natural resource development companies to take
private property to develop natural resources such as coal, gas, and
oil." Although these takings directly benefit private industry, many
states in the Interior West, wishing to ensure complete development
of their natural resources to build their economies, designated these
actions early on as "public uses" in state constitutions and statutes. 12
the retail market. See Heidi Werntz, Let's Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant
Transmission,28 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 421, 424 n.13 (2011). Thus, merchant transmission
providers do not receive a regulated, cost-based rate of return from electricity users. See
id.; see also infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of merchant
transmission operators).
8. See infra Part III.C (discussing these current lawsuits).
9. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
V (guaranteeing "just compensation" to a private party subject to a government taking);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30, 36 (1954) (holding constitutional a governmental taking
of "land to be devoted to such public purposes as streets, utilities, recreational facilities,
and schools").
10. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.C.
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Finally, the greatest controversy in this area in recent years has been
the "economic development" or "public purpose/public benefit"
takings at issue in Kelo, where the taking will not result in a public
project like a highway or a post office, nor will it result in a project
that the public can use, such as a railroad or a stadium."
Where do transmission lines fit in this legal structure? Without
transmission lines, of course, it would be impossible to bring
electricity to homes and businesses, thus making them as critical to
the country's electricity infrastructure as power plants and light bulbs.
As a result, states historically have classified transmission lines as a
"public use."14 Yet such easy categorization has become more difficult
as electricity markets around the country have been restructured,
private actors have entered the electric transmission market, and
interstate power lines are being planned and built to bring more
renewable energy, like wind and solar, from sparsely populated parts
of the country to population centers often across state lines." As
interstate transmission lines begin to resemble yet another form of
economic development that provides a "public purpose" or "public
benefit" in terms of increased renewable energy and creation of new,
interstate electricity markets, they may not always fulfill the
requirement of "use by the public." Consequently, much as there
have already been,16 there will be more calls to restrict eminent
domain authority in this area.
The issue of eminent domain authority for transmission lines is
important beyond its doctrinal implications. First, the country's
transmission grid is in need of expansion to improve reliability and to
integrate domestic renewable energy into the grid to allow greater
energy independence and achieve federal and state climate change
goals." Unlike traditional fossil fuel-generated electricity, however,

13. See infra Part I (discussing the Kelo decision and the subsequent responsive
actions taken by various states). Notably, the Kelo majority expressly determined that
"public use" need not mean that the public must actually be able to use the property, but
rather that the project must simply have a public purpose. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
14. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (discussing statutory authorization
of eminent domain for transmission lines).
15. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text (discussing proposed interstate
transmission lines to transport renewable energy).
16. See infra Part III.C (discussing eminent domain challenges to interstate
transmission lines).
17. See LETHA TAWNEY, RUTH GREENSPAN BELL & MICAH S. ZIEGLER, HIGH
WIRE ACT: ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET 6 (2011), http://pdf.wri.org/high wire-act.pdf ("While

grid infrastructure and technology has evolved over the past 100 years, there is a growing
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which can be transported to load centers by truck, rail, or ship,
renewable energy such as wind and solar can only be transported to
load centers through transmission lines."s Because the country's
renewable energy sources are generally far from population centers,19
this makes expanding the electric transmission grid critical to
achieving these important policy goals. Thus, a key assumption of this
Article is that creating and implementing policies to build new
transmission lines to connect renewable energy sources to population
centers is desirable. Certainly, there can be significant drawbacks to
some new transmission lines, most notably the environmental and
aesthetic objections that form the basis of regular opposition to such
lines-particularly when those lines run through scenic and natural
areas.20 Nevertheless, at the current time, there is no alternative
technological means to transport renewable energy long distances,
and the ability to transport renewable energy resources is critical in
the effort to transition the U.S. energy economy away from fossil
fuels, which emit the greenhouse gases that exacerbate climate
change.
Furthermore, even apart from the desire to incorporate new
renewable energy sources of electricity into the grid, the nation's
electric transmission infrastructure is in need of continuous upgrade
in order to avoid debilitating and increasingly frequent blackouts and
service interruptions.2 1 Demand for electricity increased twenty-five
percent between 1990 and 2009, but construction of transmission
facilities decreased by thirty percent during that same period.2 2
consensus that it is reaching its technological limits and requires renewed investment to
maintain reliability and meet other modern challenges.").
18. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811-12 (2012).
19. See TAWNEY, BELL & ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 6; see also BIPARTISAN POLICY
CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: POLICIES FOR A MODERN
AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 19 (2013), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites

/default/files/EnergyGrid_- Report.pdf (discussing remoteness of renewable energy
resources "from load centers").
20. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting
Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1021-22 (2009) (discussing an example of opposition to
recent transmission lines based on environmental grounds and noting that Arizona
regulators referred to one proposed line as a "230-mile extension cord" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
21. AM. SOC'Y CIVIL ENG'RS, 2009 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA'S
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/sites/default
134 (2009),
INFRASTRUCTURE
/files/RC2009_full-report.pdf (discussing the need for transmission infrastructure
investment and expansion); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 19, at 21-22
(discussing the continuing need to upgrade and expand the grid).
22. AM. SOC'Y CIVIL ENG'RS, supra note 21, at 134.

20131

TAKINGS AND TRANSMISSION

1085

Between 2000 and 2008, the United States added only 668 miles of
interstate transmission lines.23 This deficit of transmission capacity24
combined with the aging infrastructure" is leading to an increase in
blackouts and brownouts,26 costing the U.S. economy $150 billion
annually. 27 The 2003 Northeast blackout alone cost the United States
$10 billion, 28 and it demonstrated that "the current energy
infrastructure cannot always satisfy peak demand and lacks important
redundancies that would improve reliability." 29 The "chaos" that
ensued as a result of this event also showed that "the United States
could be especially vulnerable to targeted and deliberate attacks on
its power supplies."" In addition, the extreme weather that caused a
massive, multi-day blackout on the East Coast in the summer of 2012
led many to question whether America's infrastructure will be able to
withstand the more volatile weather caused by climate change.'3
FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur has suggested that $300 billion
may need to be spent on new transmission facilities by 2030.32
However, the high cost is not necessarily what is hindering the
construction of new transmission infrastructure: "In many cases ...
23. LITOS STRATEGIC COMM'N, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 6,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOESGBookSinglePa
ges%281%29.pdf. This is a problem because "new investment is ... needed to create an
effective nationwide transportation network that will facilitate long-distance electricity
transportation." Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative,
Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy
Infrastructure,44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 329 (2007).
24. See AM. SOC'Y CIVIL ENG'RS, supra note 21, at 136 ("Because the existing
transmission system was not designed to meet present demand, daily transmission
constraints or 'bottlenecks' increase electricity costs to consumers and increase the risk of
blackouts.").
25. See LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC'N, supra note 23, at 18 ("[Tjhe average age of a
substation transformer is 42, two years more than their expected life span.").
26. See id. at 7 ("There have been five massive blackouts over the past 40 years, three
of which have occurred in the past nine years.").
27. Id. at 5.
28. Fershee, supra note 23, at 328.
29. Id. at 330.
30. Id.
31. See Easy Fix Eludes Power Outage Problems in U.S., UTICA OBSERVERDISPATCH (July 4, 2012), http://www.uticaod.comlatestnews/x425610106/Easy-fix-eludespower-outage-problems-in-US (describing the frustrations of elected officials and
residents over power companies that are unprepared for extreme weather events);
Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in Weather Extremes Threatens Infrastructure,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4 (explaining that burying power lines is becoming more
economical as more intense storms batter the transmission infrastructure, and that
extreme heat is increasing peak electricity demand "higher than ever").
32. See Lynn Garner, FERC Reaffirms Rule to Remove Barriers to Building More
Transmission Lines, BNA ENVTL. REP., May 25, 2012 (explaining that LaFleur was
referring to a study that had estimated the amount needed to be spent).
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[o]verly stringent permitting requirements, lawsuits, and other
regulatory issues often inhibit construction of transmission lines."33
These regulatory difficulties, including a patchwork of changing state
and local laws governing eminent domain authority for electric
transmission lines,34 thus have significant legal and policy implications
for the future development of the grid.
Today's regulatory system governing transmission lines,
however, is not ideally adapted to meet these goals associated with
expanding the transmission grid. As explained later in this Article, the
siting and permitting of electric transmission lines takes place almost
exclusively at the state level and sometimes the local level, even
though market restructuring and the desire to integrate more
renewable energy into the grid has created significant regional and
national markets for transmission and electricity.35 Accordingly,
unlike interstate natural gas pipelines that are reviewed and approved
at the federal level,3 6 it is still largely state public utility commissions
and state courts that determine public need, public use, and eminent
domain authority for interstate transmission lines on state and private
lands." This requires a transmission operator to obtain approval for
the line from multiple state public utility commissions and secure
eminent domain authority under several states' laws in order to build
an interstate line.3 1 While this may have once worked well when stateregulated public utilities with defined, in-state territories
overwhelmingly provided electricity generation and transmission, the
fit is ill-tailored to today's more diverse, regional electricity markets.
Admittedly, there are many legal, political, and economic actors that
facilitate or impede the development of new transmission lines.
Nevertheless, eminent domain authority for transmission lines has
always been, and will likely remain, a key legal tool to facilitate the
development of such lines.
Importantly, eminent domain authority for interstate
transmission lines creates a potentially inequitable distribution of
costs and benefits among residents of neighboring states. At various
times in the nation's history, many individuals voluntarily and
involuntarily (through the exercise of eminent domain) made
33. AM. SOC'Y CIVIL ENG'RS, supra note 21, at 136.
34. See infra Part III.B-C (offering an overview of these laws).
35. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part IIA-B.
38. See infra notes 264-98 and accompanying text (comparing the various approaches
states take when granting eminent domain authority to private actors).
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significant sacrifices so that the country could create massive national
projects like the interstate highway system in the 1950s. 39 For these
projects, many policymakers considered eminent domain authority to
be critical to addressing the "assembly" problem, where landowners
in the path of the project refuse to sell their land at or near market
value because they know their property is critical to the success of the
project. 40 Should we expect individual citizens to continue to make
similar sacrifices today for "public benefits" such as increasing energy
independence and reducing greenhouse gas emissions through the
development and transmission of renewable energy? Or should the
government and its power of eminent domain stay out of most of
these projects, leaving it to the private sector to use markets and
voluntary transactions to gain control of the land?
Another concern, of course, is that governments have sometimes
abused the power of eminent domain, particularly at the expense of
low-income and underrepresented communities.4 On the other hand,
the use of eminent domain to build transmission lines for renewable
energy sources seems less likely to involve eminent domain abuse that
disrupts entire communities, since the lines are most needed to bring
remote sources of energy through relatively undeveloped areas to
population centers.42 While this Article does not attempt to fully
address or answer these fundamental questions and concerns, it raises
them in the context of interstate transmission lines to illustrate some
of the difficult problems that can arise with the use of eminent
domain.
Part I of this Article explores the different classifications of
"public use" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. It discusses the Kelo case as well as the public and state
legislative backlash to that decision. Part II turns to the use of
39. See Richard F. Weingroff, The Greatest Decade 1955-1966, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP.,
FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure
/50interstate.cfm (last modified Nov. 22, 2011) (discussing the creation of the federal
interstate highway system and use of eminent domain).
40. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (offering an example in Montana).
41. See Catherine E. Beideman, Eminent Domain and Environmental Justice: A New
Standard of Review in Discrimination Cases, 34 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 273-80
(2007) (discussing eminent domain decisions with adverse impacts on low-income and
minority communities); Ed Gordon, Weighing the Impact of the Eminent Domain Ruling,
NPR (July 1, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyld=4725974 (hosting a panel discussion of the Kelo decision, including examples of
past eminent domain actions that adversely affected low-income and minority
communities).
42. See infra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing how renewable resources are
frequently in sparsely populated areas).
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eminent domain in the context of electric transmission lines. It
explains the process by which public utilities and other transmission
operators work within state law to exercise the power of eminent
domain to build transmission lines when voluntary contractual
negotiations to obtain easements on private property fail. Part III
then explores how the transmission grid is changing, both to
incorporate more transmission lines built by private actors rather
than state-regulated public utilities and to build more multi-state,
high-voltage transmission lines to transport renewable energyparticularly wind and solar energy-from resource-rich parts of the
country to population centers. It also discusses current disputes
involving electricity transmission and eminent domain to show how
changes in the electricity grid itself are beginning to drive changes in
long-established law in this area.
Part IV begins with the premise that expanding federal authority
to approve and site interstate electric transmission lines would be the
most effective means of creating an expanded interstate transmission
grid to facilitate integration of more renewable energy into the grid
and reflect the physical and economic realities of today's interstate
grid and electricity markets. This Part also recognizes, however, that
such a major shift of authority from the states to the federal
government may not be politically feasible at the present time. Thus,
this Part goes on to consider what actions states can take on their own
to facilitate transmission expansion through their energy policies and
eminent domain laws. In doing so, Part IV considers ways to analyze
the concept of public use for interstate transmission lines, focusing
both on those lines built by private merchant companies, and for
interstate lines that benefit a multi-state region, whether or not they
are built by private parties or public utilities. Part IV concludes that
under most circumstances, states should grant private merchant
companies the same eminent domain authority to build transmission
lines as they grant to public utilities. More importantly, however,
states should ensure that their laws governing eminent domain for
transmission lines match their policy preferences for energy
development and energy export in light of today's regional
transmission grid and electricity markets.
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I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND "PUBLIC USE"

Eminent domain is the power of government to obtain title or
access to property from private parties without their consent.43 The
Fifth Amendment recognizes the right of eminent domain to "take"
property but limits it as follows: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."" Thus, the Constitution
requires that the taking be for a "public use" and that "just
compensation" be paid.45 States generally have similar limits on
eminent domain in their own constitutions and statutes"6 and, under
principles of federalism, may provide protections for private property
rights from eminent domain actions beyond what exists under federal
law.47 While most eminent domain actions are brought by
government actors, there is a long history under both state and
federal law of governments granting authority to private actors such
as railroads, utility companies, and in some cases, even mining
companies, to bring their own eminent domain actions to acquire
property to build railroad lines, roads, power lines, or industry-related
infrastructure.48
This Part first explores the definition of "public use" with a focus
on the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London.
It then looks at state legislative and judicial reactions to Kelo. In
many cases, these have narrowed the definition of "public use" for
takings involving certain types of private development (especially
urban economic development) but not necessarily for other types of
takings that also involve private development, such as electric
transmission lines or mining activities. This Part thus sets the stage for
Parts II and III, which together address how changes in the U.S.
43. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe Takings Clause presupposes that government can take private
property without the owner's consent....").
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. Id.

46. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the post-Kelo statutory
and constitutional reforms instituted on the state level); infra notes 66, 82-88 and
accompanying text (discussing state limits on eminent domain authority).
47. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (noting that many states impose "public use" requirements
that are stricter than federal law in state constitutions and statutes).
48. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing state statutory and
constitutional provisions allowing for private actors to bring eminent domain actions);
infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text (outlining the various positions states take on
merchant line eminent domain action by private parties); see also 2A JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.05[3][a] (3d ed. 2012) (discussing eminent
domain authority for railroad lines); Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent
Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 651, 654-61 (2008) (discussing eminent domain authority
for natural resource development takings).
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electricity grid in recent years have impacted the question of public
use for electric transmission lines.
A.

Kelo's Public Use Revolution
Until Kelo, the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment was far
from a "must teach" topic among constitutional and property law
scholars.49 The Court had decided only two public use cases in the
preceding forty years: Berman v. Parkerso in 1954, and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff" in 1984. In both cases, the Court
adopted a very broad definition of "public use."52 The Court did not
consider another public use case until 2005 in Kelo.i In Kelo, the
Court reviewed the City of New London's plan to redevelop its
waterfront area "to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize
an economically distressed city."54 An important part of the
redevelopment plan included a proposed $300 million research
facility for the pharmaceutical company Pfizer." New London
planners hoped the new corporate headquarters would draw new
business, create jobs, and provide "a catalyst to the area's
rejuvenation." 6 New London was unable to negotiate purchase
agreements with all the homeowners in the development area, so it
proceeded to use its statutory authority to initiate condemnation
proceedings against them."
The Court reviewed the case to determine "whether a city's
decision to take property for the purpose of economic development
satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment."" In a
five-to-four decision, the Court held that New London's use of
49. See, e.g., Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U. L. REv. 615, 615 (1940) (noting that the issue of public use was an
important part of the law of eminent domain even though the issue "has never figured in
the constitutional cases which have aroused passionate controversy, nor in those whose
names are known to the lay public").

50. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
51. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
52. See id. at 241 ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to
be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." (citations omitted)); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33
(stating that "[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive" and once an issue
is within the government's authority to protect public welfare, it may use eminent domain
to accomplish its goals).
53. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
54. Id. at 472.
55. Id. at 473.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 472.
58. Id. at 477.
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eminent domain for economic development purposes was a
constitutional public use. 9 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
reasoned that the taking was executed pursuant to a "carefully
considered" economic development plan with no evidence of an
illegitimate purpose,' and that the Court had "long ago rejected any
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public."6 1 Instead, the question of public use centered on
whether New London's development plan served a "public purpose,"
defined expansively and with "deference to legislative judgments."6 2
Applying that standard, the city's economic development plan, which
was based on the belief that the project would provide benefits to the
community in the form of new jobs and increased tax revenue, was
sufficient to meet the Court's broad public purpose requirement.63
Justice Stevens noted that the jurisprudence in this area must
recognize the differing needs in different parts of the country, as well
as the need to respond to changed circumstances over time.' Thus,
Justice Stevens relied on past cases where the Court had recognized a
public purpose associated with developing private mining, agricultural
operations, or removal of urban blight, and found "no principled way
of distinguishing" those cases from the economic development goals
of New London." Notably, though, the Court "emphasize[d] that
nothing in [the] opinion preclude[d] any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power" and that many states
had already done so through their own statutory or constitutional
law.66
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed that the taking
was for a public use but focused on the fact that New London had
acted pursuant to a formal development plan for the area, indicating a
lack of evidence of government favoritism toward private parties.67
Thus, Justice Kennedy may have reached a different result were the
risk of impermissible favoritism present; but the procedural

59. Id. at 483.
60. Id. at 478.
61. Id. at 479.
62. Id. at 480.
63. Id. at 483-84.
64. Id. at 482-83.
65. Id. at 484.
66. Id. at 489.
67. See id. at 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that even dissenting justices on
the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the "development plan was intended to
revitalize the local economy, not to serve the interests of Pfizer . .. or any other private
party" (citation omitted)).
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requirements and extensive review of the city's plan in this case did
not warrant such heightened scrutiny."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor vehemently disagreed
with the proposition that economic development alone can constitute
a public use for takings purposes. 9 While she recognized that the
government can take private property to "build a road or railroad or
to eliminate a property use that harms the public, . . . it cannot take

their property for the private use of other owners simply because the
new owners may make more productive use of the property."" She
then set out three categories of takings that comply with the public
use requirement: (1) "transfer[ring] private property to public
ownership-such as for a road, a hospital, or a military base";71 (2)
"transfer[ring] private property to private parties, often common
carriers, who make the property available for the public's use-such
as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium";72 and (3) transferring
private property to serve a broader "public purpose ... even if the

property is destined for subsequent private use."7 Without
questioning the ability of government to take private property for
public ownership or "use by the public" projects, she turned to the
more difficult question of when a "public purpose" taking meets the
public use requirement.74 She found that permitting the City of New
London's taking required too broad a reading of "public purpose,"
placing nearly all real property "susceptible to condemnation" and
beyond what the Founding Fathers could have intended." In what has
become a now-famous passage, she warned that "[nlothing is to
prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.""
Finally, also dissenting, Justice Thomas argued for the
elimination of "public purpose" altogether as a basis for eminent
domain. Instead, he concluded that the most natural reading of the
public use clause is "that it allows the government to take property
68. See id. at 493 ("There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or
otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause." (citation omitted)).
69. See id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 496.
71. Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 498 (citations omitted).
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. See id.

75. Id. at 504-05.
76. Id. at 503 (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity
whatsoever."" Justice Thomas explored the history of eminent
domain throughout the country and found that states had at first
limited eminent domain authority "to provide quintessentially public
goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and
public parks." 9 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however,
the Court strayed from this foundation and began to use "public
purpose" language in approving eminent domain for private
irrigation, mining operations, and other private industrial activity.o
Accordingly, Justice Thomas would have used this case to "revisit"
the Public Use Clause cases "and consider returning to the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take
property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use
the property.""'
B.

State Legislative Responses (and Non-Responses) to Kelo
The legal reaction to Kelo was explosive. Across the country,
state legislatures and state courts were eager to accept Justice
Stevens's invitation to limit the definition of "public use" under state
law. The supreme courts of Oklahoma and Ohio, among others,
rejected Kelo's expansive view of eminent domain and held that
economic development on its own was not a public use or public
purpose sufficient to satisfy eminent domain under state
constitutional law. The Kelo decision also incited limits to economic
development takings, and the power of eminent domain generally,
through state legislation and constitutional amendments." These laws
outlawed economic development takings entirely, focused the
definition of "blight," or imposed additional restraints on state and
local governments. By 2007, "forty-two states had enacted post-Kelo
reforms, some of which limited significantly the ability of state or
local governments to engage in the type of economic development
takings the Court found constitutional in Kelo."" Despite the flood of
78. Id.
79. Id. at 512.
80. See id. at 515-17.

81. Id. at 521.
82. See Klass, supra note 48, at 673 (discussing state judicial and statutory responses to
Kelo).
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. See id. at 673-74.
86. Id. at 674.
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post-Kelo legislation across the country, some scholars have
concluded that the majority of reforms states enacted were "largely
symbolic in nature, providing little or no protection for property
owners." 7 Notably, though, these statutes generally did not put
restrictions on eminent domain authority for private projects
associated with electricity transmission or other infrastructure
development. 8
For instance, in 2006, Pennsylvania enacted legislation that
prohibits the exercise of eminent domain to benefit private
enterprise, except where the property is taken for use by a public
utility, railroad, or common carrier, if the land is within an incidental
area within a public project, or if there is a threat to public health or
safety.89 Likewise, 2011 eminent domain reform legislation enacted
through a ballot initiative in Mississippi limited the ability of
government to take property for economic development, but created
a specific exemption for levee facilities, roads, bridges, ports, airports,
public utilities, and other projects "used in the generation,
telephone,
or
distribution
of
transmission,
storage
telecommunications, gas carbon dioxide, electricity, water, sewer,
natural gas, liquid hydrocarbons or other utility products."" Thus,
long-standing eminent domain authority granted directly to private
industry outside the urban redevelopment context was rarely
87. See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo's Trail: A Survey of State and Federal
Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.O. 703, 708 (2011)
("[A]ithough many states have ostensibly limited eminent domain authority, much of the
legislation 'passed in the wake of Kelo was substantially cosmetic and will likely have little
or no effect on economic development takings.'" (quoting Edward J. Erler, In Kelo's
Wake, HILLSDALE COLLEGE FREE MARKET FORUM 13 (2008))); Somin, supra note 6, at
2105.
88. See infra Part III.C.2.
89. H.B. 2054, 2006 Gen. Assemb., 190th Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); S.B. 881, 2006 Gen.
Assemb., 190th Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (codified at 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 204 (West
2009 & Supp. 2012)).
90. DELBERT HOSEMAN, MISS. SEC. OF STATE, INITIATIVE #31, EMINENT DOMAIN
(2011),
http://www.sos.ms.gov/initiatives/Eminent%20Domain-PW%20Revised.pdf
(prohibiting government transfer of property taken by eminent domain to private parties
for a period of ten years but creating exceptions for "drainage and levee facilities and
usage, roads and bridges for public conveyance, flood control projects with a levee
component, seawalls, dams, toll roads, public airports, public ports, public harbors, public
wayports, common carriers or facilities for public utilities and other entities used in the
generation, transmission, storage or distribution of telephone, telecommunication, gas
carbon dioxide, electricity, water, sewer, natural gas, liquid hydrocarbons or other utility
products"); see also Mississippi Voters Approve Eminent Domain Restrictions,
FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.foxnews.comi/politics/2011/11/09/mississippivoters-approve-eminent-domain-restrictions/ (reporting the passage of the ballot
initiative).

2013]

TAKINGS AND TRANSMISSION

1095

questioned as part of the post-Kelo efforts to narrow the definition of
"public use."
This eminent domain authority to private parties for industrial
and infrastructure projects has a long history in state law, particularly
in the Interior West.9t For example, "the constitutions of Colorado
(1876), Idaho (1890), Wyoming (1890), and Arizona (1911) all declare
that private property may be taken for private uses that include
reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches across the lands of others for
agricultural, mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes."92 Under
these provisions, private companies could bring eminent domain
actions on their own behalf in state court in order to acquire private
property for natural resource and other economic development, and
they could do so without state or local government officials finding
the taking to be for a public use."
Likewise, "[s]tatutes in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming specifically grant eminent domain authority to private
companies in connection with mining, oil and gas, and other natural
resource development."' Even more broadly, virtually every state
has statutes granting eminent domain authority to power companies,
railroads, and other common carriers. While the railroad, power
line, or other common carrier project historically was destined for
"use by the public," the land condemned by an oil or mining company
is generally not subject to public access or public use and thus meets
only the broad definition of "public purpose" under attack by the
Kelo dissenters.
Although many may argue that the private "natural resource
development" takings allowed in many states in the Interior West are
also an abuse of eminent domain authority, even the Kelo dissenters
did not question the ability of private parties to take property for
railroads, power lines, highways, or other projects used by the public
on the same grounds.' Indeed, the Kelo dissenters expressly

91. See Klass, supra note 48, at 657-61.
92. Id. at 657 (discussing and citing the relevant provisions in these state
constitutions).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 659.
95. Id.

96. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496-98 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing eminent domain authority for such government or common
carrier takings because they are projects that are available for use by the public and
distinguishing these takings from economic development takings); id. at 512-13 (Thomas,
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distinguished the economic development takings they would prohibit
from these more "uncontroversial" exercises of eminent domain
authority for public infrastructure projects, even if carried out by
private parties."
The question for this Article, however, is whether the same
arguments supporting eminent domain for transmission lines still hold
true. First, as described in more detail below, many states have
restructured their electricity markets, and the players in those
markets are often not public utilities subject to strict public regulation
on access and pricing." Instead, merchant transmission companies, 9
independent transmission
companies,
and rural electric
cooperatives-which are not state-regulated utilities' 01-now
construct a growing number of the transmission lines that bring
electricity to users.'0 Moreover, the new transmission lines needed to
J., dissenting) (noting that states limited their uses of eminent domain power to public uses
or public purposes).
97. See id. at 497-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing as "uncontroversial" the
power to take property to give to "private parties, often common carriers, who make the
property available for the public's use-such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a
stadium"); id. at 512-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing state use of eminent domain
"to provide quintessentially public goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals,
railroads, and public parks" as well as private roads and Mill Acts that gave rights to
private actors with common carrier duties).
98. See infra notes 247-57 (discussing the rise of merchant transmission lines).
99. For a definition of merchant transmission companies, see Transmission Planning
and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg.
49,842, 49,863 (proposed Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) ("[M]erchant
transmission projects are defined as those for which the costs of constructing the proposed
transmission facilities will be recovered through negotiated rates instead of cost-based
rates."). According to one commentator, "Unlike traditional public utilities, merchant
transmission providers assume all of a project's market risk and have no captive pool from
which to recoup project costs." Werntz, supra note 7, at 424 n.11.
100. For an explanation of independent transmission companies, see Werntz, supra
note 7, at 424 n.11 ("Merchant transmission projects are distinct from independent
transmission projects that request Commission approval for incentive rates, and whose
costs are allocated to one or more customers without each customer's contractual
consent."); see also infra notes 253-54 (discussing how independent transmission
companies often blur the lines between public and private transmission companies).
101. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, STATE STRATEGIES FOR ACCELERATING
TRANSMISSION
DEVELOPMENT
FOR
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
8
(2012),

http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1201ENERGYTRANSMISSIONWP.PD
F. Rural electric cooperatives, which are more common in Midwestern and Western states,
generate electricity and build associated transmission lines on behalf of the cooperative's
members. See id. Their rates are not regulated by public utility commissions, but they are
bound by the same state siting requirements as public utilities and other transmission
operators. Id.
102. See infra notes 252-57 (discussing statutory and regulatory changes that
encouraged the creation of private transmission companies which, in turn, have begun to
construct major, interstate transmission lines).
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transport renewable energy to demand centers cross multiple state
boundaries, providing little, if any, electricity or other "public use" to
the citizens of the states through which the lines pass."o' What then is
the "public use" or "public purpose" of a transmission line from the
perspective of a state court acting under state eminent domain law
when that line provides no direct benefit to local citizens?

II.

ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION EMINENT DOMAIN

This Part first provides the basics of the United States electric
transmission regulatory system with a particular emphasis on how the
restructuring of that system in the 1990s has changed it in ways that
are relevant to the role of eminent domain for transmission lines.104
Specifically, what was once a vertically integrated system of
generation and transmission provided by public utilities with
significant oversight by state public utility commissions has evolved
into a system with more private actors. 05 After this summary of the
electric transmission system, this Part shows how courts in various
states have struggled with determining the circumstances under which
transmission operators can exercise the power of eminent domain to
build transmission lines." While most of these cases were decided
before electricity restructuring began in the 1990s, they deal with
many issues that have become even more critical to current disputes
over eminent domain and public use. 07 These issues include the
debate over whether in-state residents will benefit from the
transmission line, the role of private actors, and the importance of
state government oversight."0 o
A.

The Electric TransmissionRegulatory System
The electricity industry in the United States consists of power
generation, high-voltage transmission of electricity over long
distances, and distribution of the power over lower voltage systems to
end users." The breakdown of electricity generation sources includes
approximately forty-two percent from coal, twenty-five percent from
103. See infra notes 258-63 (discussing proposed interstate transmission lines).
104. See infra Part II.A.

105. See infra Part ILA; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the enactment of PURPA
and the rise of private generators and transmission operators).
106. See infra Part II.B.
107. See infra Part II.B.
108. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
109. See How Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity-delivery (last visited Apr.

11, 2013) (illustrating the transfer of electricity from power plants to customers).
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natural gas, nineteen percent from nuclear, eight percent from
hydropower, and five percent from remaining renewable sources such
as wind, geothermal, and solar.110 This electricity travels across over
160,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines in the United States,
connecting with lower voltage distribution systems, linking generator
sources to users within single states and across states, and linking into
Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico."'
In terms of the transmission grid itself, there are three separate
grids (or sub-regions) in the contiguous United States-the Eastern
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT").112 Within each of these
grids, the electric network is highly interconnected, but there is
currently little, if any, interconnection between the three grids."' The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC"), a nongovernmental organization, works with eight regional entities that
subdivide the grid even further to ensure bulk power reliability.114
Until recently, electricity was a natural monopoly because most
of the industry was vertically integrated with utilities owning all
aspects of the electricity system, including the large centralized
generation facilities, transmission lines, and distribution lines. "s
Those utilities would operate in an exclusive service territory,
delivering electricity to customers for sale."' States, through their
public utility commissions ("PUCs"), regulated utilities to ensure that
they treated customers fairly and that electric rates remained
reasonable."' In exchange, utilities obtained exclusive service
110. Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity-in-the_united_states (last
updated May 2,2012).
111. See Energy, AM. Soc'Y Civ. ENG'Rs, http://apps.asce.org/reportcard
/2005/page.cfm?id=25 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); How Electricity Is Delivered to
Consumers,supra note 109.
112. See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid
Integration, 28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 155 (2007) (noting the three sub-regions of the power
24,
2009),
(Apr.
Electric Grid, NPR
U.S.
Visualizing the
grid);
398
the
(illustrating
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=110997
interconnections of the power grid).
113. See Blumsack, supra note 112, at 155.
114. About
NERC,
N.
AM.
ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY
CORP.,
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Regional Entities, N. AM.
ELECrRIC RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1191119 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2012).
115. See Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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territories and were effectively guaranteed to receive a reasonable
return on their capital investments."s During the 1920s, utilities
increasingly integrated their systems by constructing interstate
transmission lines and thus created the regional grids we have
today." 9 When states attempted to regulate the sale of electricity over
those lines, the Supreme Court held that such regulation violated the
dormant commerce clause, creating a regulatory gap known as the
"Attleboro gap" after one of the Supreme Court's decisions in this
area.120 Congress then filled that gap in 1935 when it enacted the
Federal Power Act, which granted the Federal Power Commission
(later renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or
"FERC") the exclusive authority to regulate the transmission of
electricity and the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate

commerce. 12 1
The next significant federal regulatory change in this area came
in the late 1970s with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA").122 PURPA included a provision,
section 210, which allowed independent electricity producers with
"qualifying" facilities access to the power grid and to make electricity
sales. 123 This change gave renewable resource developers and other
independent power producers a competitive foothold to challenge the
traditional vertical integration model.12 4 Moreover, with the Energy
118. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss 26-27 (1999) (discussing the presence of
regulations that "gave utilities the expectation that their companies would obtain
sufficient revenues from customers to remain financially solvent").
119. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL
372-73 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing industry concentration from 1920 through 1935); see also
Michael Dworkin et al., Energy Transmission and Storage, in THE LAW OF CLEAN
ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 531, 534-36 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011)
(discussing industry development of high-voltage transmission lines over long distances
and state and federal regulation of electricity transmission and sales).
120. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2002) (describing the "Attleboro gap,"
the development of federal regulation of transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce, and federal regulation of wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce);
Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927) (inspiring the
name for the gap).
121. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.); see also New York v. FERC,535 U.S. at 5-8.
122. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.); see FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM Rossi & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 718 (2000); Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 535.
123. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat.
3117, 3144-47 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)); BOSSELMAN, Rossi & WEAVER,
supra note 122, at 718.
124. See BOSSELMAN, Rossi & WEAVER, supra note 122, at 718-19; Dworkin et al.,
supra note 119, at 535.
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Policy Act of 1992,125 Congress directed FERC to promulgate rules
requiring utilities to provide access to transmission services on an
open and non-discriminatory basis and also to encourage significant
planning by Regional Transmission Operators ("RTOs"), states, and
industry, particularly with regard to interstate transmission. 12 6 The
goal of these efforts was to increase competition in electric generation
by ensuring that new, independent generators would have access to
utility-owned wires and thus could transmit their product to
population centers.
Also in the 1990s, many states began restructuring the regulated
utility industry and split apart the vertically integrated utility
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in
an effort to create markets and lower costs. 127 Today, approximately
half of the states have traditional regulations (with vertically
integrated utilities), and the rest are restructured or partially
restructured 128 RTOs and Independent System Operators ("ISOs"),
voluntary organizations sanctioned by FERC, manage the grid and

125. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15,
16,25,26,30,42,43, and 48 U.S.C. (2006)).
126. See id. §§ 721-722, 106 Stat. at 2915-19 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§824j-824k
(2006)). As a result of this Act, FERC promulgated Orders 888, 889, 890, and 1000. See
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(publishing Order 1000); Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35,
37) (publishing Order 890); Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly RealTime Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10,
1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37) (publishing Order 889); Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385)
(publishing Order 888).
127. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-237, ELECTRICITY
(2005),
2-3
REMAIN
CHALLENGES
KEY
RESTRUCTURING:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06237.pdf; Mark L. Fagan, Understanding the Patchwork
Quilt of Electricity Restructuring in the United States 3 (Regulatory Policy Program, John
F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Working Paper RPP-2006-04, 2006),
Power
Electric
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/research/rpp/RPP-2006-04.pdf;
Industry Overview 2007, supra note 115.
128. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-271, LESSONS LEARNED FROM
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: TRANSITION TO COMPETITIVE MARKETS UNDERWAY,
BUT FULL BENEFITS WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT TO ACHIEVE 31-33 (2002),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157320.pdf; W.M. WARWICK, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A
PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S.
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 1.1 (2002), https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/primer.pdf;

Fagan, supra note 127, at 1; Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, supra note 115;
Electricity: Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept.
2010), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructureelect.html.
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regional markets for wholesale power for a majority of states.129 As a
result, the electricity generation and transmission system has become
more regional and national in nature even while state PUCs retain
significant regulatory authority over public utilities and transmission
siting." 0 Moreover, with restructuring in some states, there is a much
larger role for private actors, rather than public utilities with discrete
service areas, to create new generation and transmission assets.13'
Thus, while federal law prohibits discrimination in access to
transmission and generation regardless of utility status, many of the
actors in today's generation and transmission system do not have a
"public" statutory mandate under state law and are subject to far less,
if any, state regulation over rates and other factors.
Although FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale power sales and the
prevention of discrimination in access to transmission lines, the primary
authority governing the permitting and siting of transmission lines
remains at the state level. 132 As a result, any interstate line must obtain
siting permission and eminent domain authority from every state through
which it passes, following each state's permitting process and standards.13
In many states, transmission lines are also subject to some degree of local
or municipal siting control.134 Most states grant their PUCs authority to
129. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators
(ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/rto.asp (last updated Apr. 11, 2012).
130. See id.; see also Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 537-39 (discussing federal and
state authority regarding transmission siting as well as the formation of RTOs).
131. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 119, at 379-84; Klass & Wilson, supra note
18, at 1806-08.
132. See Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 537-39; see also infra notes 322-24 and
accompanying text (discussing limited FERC authority to site transmission lines under the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 where the Department of Energy has designated a National
Interest Electric Transmission Corridor).
133. See Dworkin et al., supranote 119, at 537-39.
134. The degree to which local governments may exercise control over the siting of
transmission lines varies widely. In many states, the PUC is bound to honor local siting
regulations unless they are deemed unreasonable, in which case the PUC may preempt a
local regulation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-519 (2002 & Supp. 2011); MAsS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 164, § 69K (LexisNexis 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-301(e) (2011); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 62-9-3(G) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012). In other states, local and municipal
governments have primary siting authority over all transmission projects, and state
agencies have little or no meaningful control. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 43110, 45-104 (West 2012) (authorizing municipal planning commissions to enact ordinances
regulating installation of utility facilities); JEFFERSON PARISH, LA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES
§ 8-5-115.26.1(4),
available at
http://www.jeffparish.net/modules
Ishowdocument.aspx?documentid=1153
(illustrating local siting requirements in
Louisiana). In other states, the PUC has exclusive authority over transmission lines above
a specified kV capacity and length, while smaller and/or shorter lines remain under
exclusive local control. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.01(B)(1)(b) (LexisNexis
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review and approve transmission lines as well as electric generating
facilities."' The transmission siting laws in each state vary, but most
of them focus on the "need" for the line, the effect of the line on
reliability, alternatives to the new line, and the potential
environmental impacts of the line.'36 This review process, if
successful, generally culminates in a line receiving a certificate called,
among other things, a "Certificate of Need" or a "Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity."" Once a transmission operator
receives the necessary certificate to build the line, it can generally
exercise the power of eminent domain if it fails to reach voluntary
agreements with all landowners over the required easements.' 8 As
discussed in more detail in Part III.B, in some states, only public
utilities and not private transmission companies can exercise the
power of eminent domain to build transmission lines.139 In other
states, statutes specify transmission lines as a per se public use and,
Supp. 2012); id. § 4906.05 (LexisNexis 2000) (transmission lines under 125 kV capacity are
"not exempt from state or local laws or regulations," but those over 125 kV are).
135. See Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 538; Klass & Wilson, supranote 18, at 1807.
136. See Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 538-39.
137. See generally STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY,
EDISON ELEC. INST. (Mar. 2012), http://www.eei.orglourissues/electricitytransmission
/documents/state-generation-transmission-siting-directory.pdf (identifying Michigan and
Minnesota as issuing a "Certificate of Need" and Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming as issuing a "Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity"); see also Rossi,
supra note 20, at 1019-22 (discussing state siting statutes, certificates of need, and eminent
domain authority for transmission lines).
138. See Rossi, supra note 20, at 1019-21. Many states first require that the condemnor
attempt to negotiate in good faith to purchase the land without the benefit of eminent
domain, subject to judicial review. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-161 (Supp. 2012); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 117.036 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013). If negotiations fail then the condemnor
must provide notice of the appraised value and the condemnor's intent to appropriate the
land. E.g., id. § 117.036 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013). The condemnee may challenge the
alleged public purpose after receiving notice. See, e.g., id. § 117.055. The condemnor must
then file a petition with the court describing the land to be condemned and identifying
both the condemnor and condemnee. Eg., id. After the land is officially appraised, the
condemnor must pay the appropriate damages to the condemnee. E.g., id. § 117.155 (West
2005). Either party may then contest the commissioners' report via jury trial. E.g., id.
§ 117.165. Mechanisms for determining the fair market value of the land include past
history of sales, court evaluation, panels of commissioners, and jury trials. Compare, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 18-1A-151 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing for judicial determination of fair
market value by default), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 154 (1992 & Supp. 2012)
(providing for a state-appointed commission to appraise the property if condemning
authority is unable to negotiate a purchase), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-1 (2004)
(mandating a jury trial to determine compensation "[iln all cases").
139. See supra notes 99-100 (defining merchant transmission companies and
independent transmission companies); infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text: infra
Appendix A (collecting statutes and cases from all fifty states).
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thus, both private entities and public utilities can exercise eminent
domain authority.14 0 Yet in other states, statutes and case law are not
clear on which entities can and cannot exercise eminent domain
authority. 4 '
Eminent Domain Authority, Transmission Lines, and Public Use
Early courts declared that eminent domain was necessary for
government to function. 42 Courts generally accepted that eminent
domain was an "attribute of sovereignty," 143 an inherent power that
the Framers took as a "given" that they only sought to limit through
the Public Use 44 and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment.145 The Supreme Court observed:

B.

[The Public Use and Just Compensation Clauses] serve to
protect "the security of Property," which Alexander Hamilton
described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of the "great
obj[ects] of Gov[ernment]." Together they ensure stable
property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent
140. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
142. See Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The taking of
private property for public use upon just compensation is so often necessary for the proper
performance of governmental functions that the power is deemed to be essential to the life
of the State."); Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) ("[T]he
right of every State to authorize the appropriation of every description of property for a
public use is one of those inherent powers which belong to state governments, without
which they could not well perform their great functions."); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold
Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) ("[Tihere might be exceptional times and places in
which the very foundations of public welfare could not be laid without requiring
concessions from individuals to each other upon due compensation which under other
circumstances would be left wholly to voluntary consent.").
143. See, e.g., Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) ("The right of eminent
domain, that is, the right to take private property for public uses, appertains to every
independent government. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of
sovereignty. The clause found in the Constitutions of the several States providing for just
compensation for property taken is a mere limitation upon the exercise of the right."). But
see Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 517, 527 (2009) ("The fact that
takings might be thought to have been an unavoidable part of the package of powers
granted to a sovereign power in seventeenth-century political theory hardly commends
itself as a reason to recognize a power of eminent domain today.").
144. American courts have recognized since the founding that a legislature cannot pass
"a law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
145. 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.01[1][a][ii]-[iii]
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (discussing the inherent power theory and James
Madison's role in limiting the takings clause); see U.S. CONsT. amend. V (providing that
private property cannot "be taken for public use, without just compensation").
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domain power-particularly against those owners who . .. may

be unable to protect themselves in the political process against
the majority's will.146
One of the main reasons cited for eminent domain's necessity is
that, without it, government would face possibly debilitating problems
in assembling the necessary land for government buildings and
projects:
[The United States's] independent existence and perpetuity ...
cannot be preserved if the obstinacy of a private person, or if
any other authority, can prevent the acquisition of the means or
instruments by which alone governmental functions can be
performed.... If the right to acquire property for such uses
may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of propertyholders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to
the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may
be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its
practical existence upon the will of a State, or even upon that of
a private citizen. This cannot be.'47
The phenomenon described above is commonly referred to as
the "holdout problem," whereby one property owner takes advantage
of the fact that the government- needs (or greatly desires) his
particular parcel by demanding payment that significantly exceeds the
value of the property, thus derailing the project. 48 However, not
everyone is convinced that the government would cease to function
without eminent domain.149 Others note how the potential for

146. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
147. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
148. See Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781-82 (Mich. 2004) ("If a
property owner between points A and B holds out--say, for example, by refusing to sell his
land for any amount less than fifty times its appraised value-the construction of the
railroad is halted unless and until the railroad accedes to the property owner's demands.
And if owners of adjoining properties receive word of the original property owner's
windfall, they too will refuse to sell. The likelihood that property owners will engage in
this tactic makes the acquisition of property for railroads, gas lines, highways, and other
such 'instrumentalities of commerce' a logistical and practical nightmare."); see also Bell,
supra note 143, at 531 ("Imagine that the land in the valley is owned by a number of
private individuals. The government must now purchase for the reservoir all the valley
parcels in the drainage basin; even one holdout in the middle of the planned reservoir can
ruin the project .. . [and] strategic considerations may block the transaction.").
149. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553, 560 (1972) ("It is far from certain that eminent domain power is 'inherent' in
the sense governments would perish if they did not have it. Natural persons and corporate

bodies conduct all sorts of activities with great success without any such power. [Without
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condemnation often aids governments and those with delegated
powers in the negotiation process so that the need to invoke the
15
power never arises.o
Putting aside this debate, the fact remains that, early on, state
legislatures granted the power of eminent domain to utility
companies and others to generate electricity and build the means of
transporting it. Early courts had no difficulty upholding that authority
as a public use. For instance, in 1904, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court stated that whether "the use of land for constructing and
maintaining a line of wires to conduct currents of electricity ... for all
persons who may desire such service, or in lighting public streets,
highways, and buildings ... is a 'public use' . . . is beyond question.""s'

Likewise, the Vermont Supreme Court in 1912 declared, "To hold
that the supplying of electric current for heat and power is not . . .
'proper, useful, and needful for the government to provide,' is to close
our eyes to conditions which surround us."l 5 2 These early judicial
sentiments have continued, for the most part, resulting in the
enactment of the statutes around the country described in Part II
expressly granting eminent domain authority to public utilities and, in
many states, even private entities proposing to construct electric
transmission lines. 5 3
Not surprisingly, landowners have often challenged the power of
utility companies and others to take their property by eminent
domain for transmission lines.'5 4 While many of these challenges
focus on the route of the line or the amount of compensation paid,
there have also been challenges regarding whether the line is a
"public use.""' These challenges raise issues such as whether the line
is intended to bring electricity to a private party rather than the public
at large, whether the transmission operator is a regulated public
eminent domain], [l]and ... could usually be acquired, though perhaps not always exactly
where desired and, no doubt, at a higher average cost than if it could be expropriated.").
150. See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting TransmissionLines in a Changed Milieu:
Evolving Notions of the "Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations,
81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 760 n.223 (2010) ("[Tjhe negotiating dynamics of acquiring
property, and most likely the resulting price, can be heavily influenced by the fact that a
seller is aware that the buyer possesses the power to condemn the seller's property in the
absence of a mutually acceptable, consensual agreement.").
151. Rockingham Cnty. Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 58 A. 46, 47 (N.H. 1904).
152. Rutland Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Clarendon Power Co., 83 A. 332, 336 (Vt.
1912).
153. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Part II.B.1-2 (discussing lawsuits challenging eminent domain authority
for transmission lines).
155. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
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utility, and whether the line is intended to provide power to out-ofstate users rather than in-state users. These cases are significant
because they form a legal foundation that courts and legislators will
need to consider as the industry moves toward more private
companies building transmission lines and as new interstate lines
increasingly provide power exclusively to out-of-state users. While
this would be less of a problem if the federal government had plenary
authority to approve transmission lines on state and private lands
taking into account national and regional public benefits, state courts,
applying state law, currently make those determinations.s' This often
creates a mismatch between state regulatory authority and the
emerging regional and national transmission system.'
Indeed, while the push for more renewable energy and the
restructuring of electricity markets have made these tensions even
more acute, the case law prior to these developments remains
relevant today. That case law can help answer current questions and
controversies, such as: (1) Is it within a state's jurisdiction to find a
"public use" for purposes of eminent domain authority to build a line
partially in that state where the benefit of increased electricity goes
primarily or exclusively to out-of-state users or a private party?; and
(2) Is a transmission line a public use when it is designed to serve the
interests of a single, private power user? In both situations, courts
must address broader questions of whether transmission lines are
public benefit/public purpose takings due to the general public
benefits stemming from the transmission system, including economic
development brought about by improved infrastructure.

156. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress granted authority to the U.S.
Department of Energy to determine whether any areas of the country were experiencing
transmission constraints or congestion and, if so, classifying such areas as National Interest
Transmission Corridors ("NIETCs"). See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§ 1221, 119 Stat. 594, 946-51 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006)). NIETC
designation allows FERC to exercise "backstop" siting authority under section 216 of the
Federal Power Act and override state barriers to transmission siting. See id. Despite this
authority, efforts by the DOE to designate NIETCs and efforts by FERC to enact rules to
implement its backstop siting authority have been successfully challenged in the courts.
See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011)
(vacating the designation of NIETCs); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304,
313 (4th Cir. 2009) (invalidating the FERC rule on backstop siting authority), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1138 (2010). As a result of these decisions, federal authority over transmission
siting on state and private lands remains limited. See generally Klass & Wilson, supra note
18, at 1817-21, 1859-65 (discussing limited federal authority over transmission siting off
federal lands).
157. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1828-31, 1857-58.
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1. In-State Versus Out-of-State Benefits
Some states have historically taken a narrow view regarding
whether a transmission line qualified as a public use based on
whether in-state residents, out-of-state residents, or both would
benefit from the line. For instance, in Mississippi Power & Light Co.
v. Conerly,58 a Mississippi power company brought a condemnation
action to obtain rights-of-way for a high-voltage line that would
transmit power to a Louisiana power company for distribution in that
The Mississippi PUC granted a certificate of public
state.'
convenience and necessity for the line, and the company then sought
to use eminent domain under a state statute granting eminent domain
authority for the construction and operation of power lines. 6 0 In a
1984 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a district court
order dismissing the condemnation petition.16 1 Quoting the district
court's findings, it agreed that "[n]ot one Mississippi customer is to be
served by the proposed transmission line," "that the terms 'public
necessity' and 'public use' . . . contemplate use by the citizens of this

state," and that the power company's contention that the line could
be altered to bring power back to Mississippi if warranted by future
demand was speculative.162 The court was clearly influenced by two
important facts: (1) because no in-state customers would be served,
the Mississippi PUC would have no jurisdiction to establish or
approve rates for the interstate sale of the electricity; and (2) the total
cost of the line would be approximately $25 million, and that cost
incurred by the Mississippi power company would be passed on to
Mississippi consumers once it was added to the utility's next rate
increase request.6

Likewise, in Clark v. Gulf Power Co. ,'" the Florida District
Court of Appeal held in 1967 that a state's power of eminent domain
exists "only within its territorial limits for the use and benefit of the
people within the state."' 5 As a result, the court found that a "one
way transmission line" from Florida to Georgia for which Florida
citizens "will not derive one iota of benefit" was beyond that state's

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

460 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1984).
Id. at 108-09.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 109, 112.
198 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 371.
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eminent domain authority, despite "conjecture" that electrical current
flowing back and forth would benefit residents of both states.'66
Not all state courts, however, have viewed the "public use" or
"public benefit" of transmission through such an in-state lens, at least
when some in-state residents are benefitted. For instance, in Shedd v.
Northern Indiana Public Service Corp.,' 7 the Indiana Supreme Court
held in 1934 that eminent domain authority existed for a power
company to build a transmission line that would serve both in-state
and out-of-state residents.'6 The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the state-regulated public utility had no power of
eminent domain for uses constituting interstate commerce.169 The
court, citing an Alabama case concerning a dam, explained the grant
of eminent domain authority in this situation:
While a state will take care to use this power for the benefit of
its own people, it will not refuse to exercise it for such purpose,
because the inhabitants of a neighboring state may incidentally
partake of the fruits of its exercise. Such refusal would violate
the principles of just public policy, and the neighborly comity
which should exist between states.o7 0
Even in this case, however, the court implied that if all of the
benefits of the project were solely for residents of other states, there
would not be a sufficient public use to justify the utility's exercise of
eminent domain authority. 171
The Indiana Court of Appeals appeared to further relax the
public use necessary to exercise eminent domain in the 1980 case of
Oxendine v. Public Service Co. 2 In Oxendine, PSI, a public utility,
sought eminent domain authority to build a new transmission line it
contended was necessary to ensure the stability and reliability of its
network in general rather than to provide electricity service to
166. Id.
167. 188 N.E. 322 (Ind. 1934).
168. Id. at 325-26.
169. Id. at 325.
170. Id. (quoting Columbus Waterworks Co. v. Long, 25 So. 702,703 (Ala. 1899)).
171. See id. at 326. See generally Gralapp v. Miss. Power Co., 194 So. 2d 527 (Ala. 1967)
(allowing an out-of-state company to exercise eminent domain in Alabama to build a
transmission line because: (1) a statute provided the same right of eminent domain to
foreign and domestic corporations; (2) the power company established that electricity
would flow in both directions along the line, thus benefitting the public in Alabama as well
as Mississippi even though most of the projects benefits went to Mississippi; and (3)
Alabamans would benefit from more interconnectedness, which would give them
alternative sources of energy in an emergency as well as lower cost energy when one
system could transfer its cheaper, excess power to the other system that needs it).
172. 423 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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customers in its territory.' Landowners challenged that authority on
grounds that the line would not serve the needs of Indiana residents,
but instead would supply electricity to other power companies with
service mostly outside the state." In rejecting the challenge, the court
cited an Indiana statute granting eminent domain authority to
companies furnishing or transmitting electrical energy "for the use of
the public." 7 s The court held that this grant of eminent domain
authority was to furnish electricity to "the public, not to Indiana
residents alone."' 6 Thus, the court appeared to embrace a much
broader vision of "public use" that encompassed the needs of the
regional electricity network in general rather than solely the
balkanized needs of in-state residents.
Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided a case in 1976,
Square Butte Electric Cooperative v. Hilken,177 in which the majority
opinion embraced a more regional vision of public use to justify
eminent domain. 78 An electrical cooperative in North Dakota that
distributed electricity wholesale to its members sought to acquire
easements for a transmission line that would provide direct benefits
to members in Minnesota, while leaving open the possibility that it
might provide power to North Dakota members in the future if
demand was sufficient. Analyzing authority from other states, the
court determined that for a public use to exist, the following
requirements must be met: (1) the public in the state must have either
an actual benefit or a right to benefit guaranteed by regulatory
control through a public service commission regulating the actor
seeking eminent domain; (2) the public in the state authorizing the
benefit must derive a substantial and direct benefit even if other
states are also benefitted; and (3) the public benefit to the state must
be attached to the territorial limits of the state because the state's
sovereignty is likewise constrained. 80

173. Id. at 614.
174. Id. at 615.

175. Id. at 617 (citing IND. CODE § 32-11-3-1 (repealed 2002)).
176. Id.
177. 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 1976).

178. See id. at 526-30 (analyzing the power sales agreements between an out-of-state
and an in-state electrical cooperative and recognizing that there was a reasonable

probability that in-state customers would benefit from the out-of-state utility). The
regional approach taken by the majority stands in sharp contrast to the dissenting judges
in the case who argued that "public use" must be for the inhabitants of the state and not
for inhabitants of other states. See id. at 535-36 (Sand, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 521-22, 529 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 525.
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Based on the facts before it, the court found a sufficiently
substantial and direct benefit to North Dakota as a result of the line
because it would provide additional reliability to the system as a
whole and reduce the frequency of outages (even though no witness
was able to testify to significant outages in the past).' As a result, the
court reversed the district court's decision not to consider reliability
as a factor in determining the benefits to North Dakota residents.In
The court also rejected arguments that North Dakota could not
possibly receive any power from the line in the future because the
Minnesota cooperative members outnumbered the North Dakota
members on the board.' Instead, the court expressed skepticism that
North Dakota's "needs and advantages" would be "overshadowed by
a zealous state patriotism."" Although the court recognized that the
North Dakota PUC did not have regulatory control over the
cooperative because it was not a public utility and only sold power
wholesale, the court refused to let that undermine the public interest
in the project without "a showing that the contract [was] designed
only to defraud North Dakota by allowing eminent domain without
an attendant benefit to the State."' 85
In a concurring opinion, Justice Paulson concluded that the
broad legislative grant of eminent domain authority to transmission
lines foreclosed the district court's narrower interpretation. 186 Justice
Paulson explained this broad grant historically; he noted that at the
time the state's eminent domain rules were written, the state's
greatest concern related to the "bolstering of the State's economy.""8
Further, legislators assumed that the public welfare would be
"benefitted by anything which would enhance the opportunity to
market our natural resources and excess energy."' Thus, while such
economic development must now be balanced by conservation and
environmental protection, the "energy situation" is still a national
"crisis," not controllable within the borders of any one state. 89
Therefore, the risk was that the federal government would completely
take over these affairs "if the States adopt too provincial an

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 526-27.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532 (Paulson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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attitude."190 He then cited to classic economic development public use
cases such as Berman v. Parker9' and found the public use in the
current case well within that broad definition."
The dissenters in Square Butte Electric Cooperative, however,
focused on private property rights, particularly private property rights
in North Dakota.193 Justice Sand cited to the public use clause of the
North Dakota Constitution and stated that it could only refer to the
public use of state inhabitants or would otherwise be invalid.194
Unlike the majority, he did not see the increase in reliability in the
transmission system as sufficient to provide the "direct" and
"substantial" benefit necessary to justify eminent domain. 195 Since this
was a direct current ("DC") line rather than an alternating current
("AC") line, the power could not be converted until it passed into
Minnesota, thus providing no benefits for North Dakota residents.1 96
He concluded that the majority opinion "permits pirating North
Dakota resources and land primarily for the benefit of persons other
than the inhabitants of the State of North Dakota."' 97 For his separate
dissent, Justice Vogel also discounted the "public benefit" associated
with increased reliability of the interstate transmission system in
question and argued that because this justification would apply to any
line anywhere, it improperly expanded the right of eminent domain. 98
190. Id.
191. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
192. Square Butte Elec. Coop., 244 N.W.2d at 533 (Sand, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 533-40.
194. Id. at 534.
195. Id. at 536-37.
196. Id. at 537. Most electric transmission in the United States today is AC, which
allows power to move in both directions. See Patrick J. Kiger, High-Voltage DC
Breakthrough Could Boost Renewable Energy, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (Dec.
5, 2012), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/12/121206-high-voltage-dcbreakthrough/. Over very long distances, however, DC, in which power moves in only one
direction, is more efficient and results in less power loss over the length of the line. Id.; see
also
About
HVDC
Technology,
CLEAN
LINE
ENERGY
PARTNERS,
http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/technology/hvdc (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (discussing
the advantages of high voltage direct current). Today, new, high-voltage DC ("HVDC")
lines are often proposed as the most efficient and economical method of transporting wind
power long distances. See About HVDC Technology, supra; see also Daniel Cusick, Texas
Company's 'Clean Lines' TransmissionPlans ProgressDespite Tax Credit Stalemate, E&E
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2012/10/02/1 (discussing
use of DC transmission for Clean Line Energy Partners's interstate transmission line
projects designed to bring large amounts of wind energy from the Midwestern to Eastern
cities); Iowa's Energy Future: Transmission Lines in Iowa, SIERRA CLUB,
http://iowa.sierraclub.org/Energy/Transmission.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (explaining
HVDC lines proposed for wind power transport in Iowa).
197. Square Butte Elec. Coop., 244 N.W.2d at 538 (Sand, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 538-39.
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He also questioned the right of a power cooperative organized by a
"private utility" to exercise eminent domain for its own private
interests. 9
A review of these cases allows a few tentative conclusions. Not
surprisingly, those states that see themselves as natural resources
exporters, like North Dakota, more fully encompass regional benefits
in considering whether a transmission line is a public use. 2 m Other
states, or at least their courts, have historically been more hostile to
facilitating interstate electricity transfers, particularly if it means
ratepayers in the state are paying for lines to send electricity to other
states. 20 1 That was a significant issue in Mississippi Power & Light
Co. 202 In more recent years, Arizona has been hostile to building lines
and infrastructure to facilitate exporting electricity to California.203
These public use issues will only become more salient as California
attempts to implement its thirty-three percent renewable energy
standard.2 04 It is likely that the state cannot easily meet that
requirement solely with in-state renewable resources but must look to
wind, solar, and hydropower resources in the Pacific Northwest and
the desert Southwest which require new transmission development in
those states. 205 Thus, whether to define the "public" on a state or
regional basis remains critical to transmission planning, transmission
siting, and the overall development of the electricity grid.
2. Distinguishing Private and Public Use
Another set of public use cases involving transmission lines
centers around whether the recipient of the energy transported by the
new line is a private entity or "the public." For instance, in Montana
Power Co. v. Bokma,2 06 a public utility sought eminent domain
authority to construct a power line to serve a pipeline company in the
state as well as to meet power needs as they developed in the region
through normal growth. 207 Initially, the proposed line would serve
199. Id. at 539.
200. See id at 526-29, 532-34.
201. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 112-13 (Miss. 1984).
202. Id.
203. See Rossi, supra note 20, at 1022 (discussing controversial transmission line
proposed to run from Arizona to California).
204. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1836-40 (discussing California RPS and the
state's potential need to import renewable energy resources from other states in the region
to meet the RPS).
205. See id.
206. 457 P.2d 769 (Mont. 1969).
207. Id. at 771.
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only the pipeline company, but service from the line could be
available to other customers upon request. 20 8 In responding to
landowners' challenges to eminent domain authority on public use
grounds, the Montana Supreme Court, in a 1969 decision, upheld the
utility's eminent domain authority.20 9 The court recognized the
conflicting lines of authority in other jurisdictions between the broad
"public benefit" approach to public use and the narrower "use by the
public" framework.2 10 The court found that Montana had always
adhered to the broad view, "presumably to promote general
economic development."2 11 Here, though, the court appeared to
merge the two approaches, finding that "public benefit" was the
standard but that "public benefit" meant "the right of the public to
use the proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought,"
whether or not the right is exercised.2 12 Thus, because other
customers would have the same right as the pipeline company to use
the transmission line, there was sufficient public benefit for the
taking.2 13 Moreover, the fact that the Montana Power Company was a
public utility was critical. As such, "it ha[d] dedicated its property to
the public use under regulations imposed by the Montana Public
Service Commission. "214 Thus, if it ever refused to serve other
customers, "it [could] be compelled to do so in a proper case."215
Likewise, in Public Service Co. v. Shaklee,21 6 the Colorado
Supreme Court held in 1989 that a public utility could exercise
eminent domain authority to build a power line to provide electrical
service to the Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") for mining
activities.1 In response to landowner contentions that construction of
the transmission line was an illegal exercise of eminent domain for a
private use, the court found that because the public had the right to
use the line on equal terms with Coors, the public use requirement
was met.2 18 As in Bokma, the Colorado court focused on the fact that

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 772.
See id. at 772-73.
See id. at 773.
Id.
Id.
784 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1989).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 318-19.
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the utility was a regulated monopoly and was "obligated to provide
service to the public without discrimination."219
3. Summary
In both sets of cases described above, courts have struggled with
defining what constitutes "the public." Does it include out-of-state
electricity users as well as in-state users? Does the fact that the
transmission operator is a public utility subject to extensive state
regulation render the entire project sufficiently "public" even if outof-state or private users will be the immediate beneficiaries of the
line? Notably, the question of defining the boundaries of "the public"
generally arises when state PUCs consider the "public need" or
"public necessity" for the line in the first place in the certificate of
need process, which usually precedes any eminent domain action or
line construction. 2 0 While a few states have redefined public need,
219. Id. at 319.
220. Most states require all transmission operators to obtain a Certificate of Need,
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN"), or equivalent certificate from
the PUC or comparable state agency prior to commencing construction on a new major
transmission facility and, either implicitly or explicitly, prior to exercising eminent domain.
See Rossi, supra note 20, at 1019-22 (discussing state siting statutes, certificates of need,
and eminent domain authority for transmission lines). Eight states-Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-by contrast, appear to allow
eminent domain authority for transmission lines without first obtaining a state certificate.
Colorado and Wisconsin require a CPCN prior to construction of a transmission line, but
not prior to condemnation of the land on which the line will be constructed. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 40-5-101 (2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.49(1)(am), 196.49(3)(c) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2012); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 317 (Colo. 1989); Miller v.
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 272 P.2d 283, 285 (Colo. 1954). Georgia and Hawaii require the
operator to hold community meetings prior to exercising eminent domain, but do not
require a CPCN. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-160.1 (Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 269-27.5, 269-27.6(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2011). In 2006, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the legislature had intentionally left the evaluation of public need up to electric
utilities and that the siting body had no authority to make necessity determinations. See
Forsyth Cnty. v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 632 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Ga. 2006). Indiana requires
state approval of the operator's status as a public utility before it exercises eminent
domain, but does not require approval of a CPCN prior to an established utility's use of
eminent domain. Alabach v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 329 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542, 551, 560 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011) (discussing statutes defining "public utility" and jurisdiction over making the
determination as to whether a corporation is a public utility). See generally Re AEP Ind.
Mich. Transmission Co., No. 44000, 2011 WL 5505445 (Ind. U.R.C. Nov. 2, 2011)
(requesting approval of status as a public utility). Louisiana does not have any state level
oversight of transmission lines and leaves siting and eminent domain decisions to the
courts. See generally Notice of Proposed General Order and Request for Comments, La.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket R-26018 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 17, 2012), available at
http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/starNiewFile.aspx?ld=e5ba79e-e4b3-4828-alc6d478e9132b01 (considering introduction of stronger state authority). Utah requires
regulated utilities to obtain a CPCN prior to construction of transmission lines, but does
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benefit, or necessity in recent years to encompass regional impacts,
most have not, maintaining a parochial view. 221 As more private
merchant companies enter the transmission market, and as both
federal and state governments attempt to encourage more interstate
transmission lines for reliability and renewable energy purposes,
these questions will arise with even greater frequency. If courts do not
view these new transmission projects as sufficiently "public," the
corresponding lack of eminent domain authority in many states will
be a significant hurdle to realizing these growing energy policy goals
of increasing renewable energy and maintaining grid reliability.
Therefore, establishing a consistently broad interpretation of "the
public" will prove essential to continuing to meet the nation's energy
needs.
III. INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION CORRIDORS, THE RISE OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY, AND CURRENT TRANSMISSION CONFLICTS

This Part explores how the electric generation and transmission
system in the United States has developed in recent years. It focuses
specifically on the growth of regional interstate transmission markets
and the desire for new, interstate transmission lines. 222 Driving these
new interstate lines are efforts to increase the reliability of these
regional systems and bring more renewable energy online to meet
state renewable energy mandates. 223 This Part then turns to recent
disputes over the use of eminent domain for transmission lines. 2 24
These disputes reflect many of the same concerns that courts focused
on in the earlier cases discussed in Part 1I, but raise even more
difficult issues surrounding the use of eminent domain for interstate
not require the same of non-utilities, which may proceed directly with local permit
applications. See Barnes v. Lehi City, 279 P. 878, 883 (Utah 1929); Brown & Rossi, supra
note 150, at 720. Similarly, Wyoming requires public utilities to obtain a CPCN prior to
construction of a line, but the Wyoming Supreme Court held in 2005 that a regional
electric generation and transmission cooperative, over which the Public Service
Commission did not have jurisdiction, did not require a CPCN. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26816, 37-2-205(a) (2011); Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 2005 WY 108,
$ 1, 12, 118 P.3d 996, 998, 1003-04 (Wyo. 2005).
221. See Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,
THE ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23, 23-34 (discussing continuing parochial views of
most states in certificate of need proceedings as well as a few state courts or legislatures
that have begun to consider regional needs in these determinations); see also Brown &
Rossi, supra note 150, at 748-51 (discussing the need for a broader definition of "public
interest" in states' transmission siting laws to reflect developing regional and national
markets for electricity and transmission).
222. See infra Part III.A.
223. See infra Part III.A-B.
224. See infra Part III.C.
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transmission projects as a result of the scope and regional nature of
these projects.
A.

TransmissionInvestment, Reliability, and Integrationof
Renewables
There is a general consensus that more transmission is needed in
the United States to maintain grid reliability, meet growing demand,
and integrate more renewable energy into the grid. 225 New
transmission capacity is particularly critical for renewable energy
because the best sources of renewable energy are available in more
sparsely populated parts of the country with underbuilt transmission
resources.2? The result is new renewable generation sources waiting
for years to connect to the transmission grid in many regions of the
country. 227 Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that unlike
traditional energy sources such as coal, natural gas, or uranium that
can be transported by train, truck, or ship to load centers, renewable
energy resources such as wind and solar can only be transported from
the point of generation to load centers through transmission lines. 22 8

225. See A. SCHUMACHER, S. FINK & K. PORTER, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
MOVING BEYOND PARALYSIS: How STATES AND REGIONS ARE CREATING
INNOVATIVE TRANSMISSION PROJECTS MAY 2009-MAY 2010, at 1 (2009),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46691.pdf (discussing drop in level of transmission
investment through the 1990s that is only now beginning to rise); MIDWEST INDEP. SYS.
OPERATOR,
TRANSMISSION
EXPANSION
PLAN
2011,
at
1
(2011),
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Study/MTEP/MTEP11/MTEP11%2ORep
ort.pdf (recommending $6.5 billion in new transmission expansion through 2021 for the
MISO region alone as part of "a continuing effort to ensure a reliable and efficient electric
grid that keeps pace with energy and policy demands"); see also U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, 20%
WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY'S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S.
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 97 (2008), http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/41869.pdf
(stating that "significant additional transmission capacity would be required to integrate
high levels of wind across the country"); WIRES & THE BRATTLE GROUP, EMPLOYMENT
AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN THE
U.S.
AND
CANADA
1
(2011),
http://wiresgroup.com/images/BrattleWIRESJobsStudy.May2011.pdf ("[M]eeting economic and public policy goals, in
particular congestion relief and renewable energy standards, has created additional
growing needs of transmission investment, underscoring the multi-faceted benefits of a
robust transmission network, which the recent increase in investments has only started to
address."); supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text (discussing the need for upgrade in
the nation's electric transmission infrastructure).
226. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CrR., supra note 19, at 19 (including a map and
discussion illustrating long distances between wind energy resources and load centers);
TAWNEY, BELL & ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 6.
227. SCHUMACHER, FINK & PORTER, supra note 225, at 1.
228. See MARCELINO MADRIGAL & STEVEN STOFT, TRANSMISSION EXPANSION FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY SCALE-UP: EMERGING LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at xi
(2011),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTENERGY2/Resources
/Transmission-Expansion-and-RE.pdf ("Unlike fossil-fuel based power sources, renewable
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Humans cannot control where the sun shines and where the wind
blows. Therefore, new interstate transmission lines are critical to
bringing those renewable resources to population centers.
Thus, in order to meet current reliability needs as well as to add
meaningful amounts of renewable energy to the system, transmission
development cannot remain stagnant. The problem is that unlike new
generation facilities that can take one to three years to plan and
construct, a new interstate transmission line can take over a decade to
plan and construct.22 9 A significant part of that delay is a result of
state permitting obstacles, but another part is the inevitable
challenges by landowners to all aspects of the transmission lineincluding whether there is eminent domain authority to obtain
easements.230 As the parties building the lines become less "public" in
nature and the benefits of the line become more difficult to ascribe
directly to the residents of the states through which the lines will
travel, the question of public use becomes increasingly significant.
Much of the urgency surrounding new transmission results from
state efforts to require a certain percentage of electricity produced in
the state to come from renewable resources.2" With few federal
policies mandating renewable energy development, states have taken
an active role in developing their own policies to promote renewable

energy sources are greatly site-constrained and, for this reason, transmission networks
need to be expanded to reach the renewable energy sites.").
229. See N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL, LONG-TERM RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT 33 (2011), http://www.nerc.com/files/2011LTRA Final.pdf (stating that
delays to transmission construction due to permitting and siting continue to limit the
industry from building new and vital transmission infrastructure and, once planning is
complete, a project can take ten or more years to permit, site, and build); see also EDISON
ELECTRIC INST., TRANSMISSION
PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE, at iv (2012),
http://www.wiresgroup.com/docs/EEITransmission%20Projects_042312.pdf
(providing
details on a cross-section of transmission projects completed in 2011 and planned for the
next ten years, highlighting large, interstate projects representing a $42 billion investment,
and which "face significant challenges for siting, permitting, cost allocation, and cost
recovery").
230. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 225, at 99 (noting that local opposition to
transmission lines "is often a major challenge to transmission expansion," that even
though AC transmission lines generally benefit all users along its path by increasing
reliability, local owners "do not always value such benefits," and that state agencies
sometimes reject interstate transmission proposals "if it appears that they would not result
in significant benefits for intrastate residents").
231. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1809-11, 1832-43 (discussing how state
RPSs are driving the need for new transmission to bring renewable resources across state
lines); see also supra notes 17-19, 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing why
integration of renewable energy into transmission grid requires transmission build-out).
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energy. 232 Historically, just a small fraction of electricity produced in
the United States was generated from renewable energy sources.
Most of this electricity was generated from biomass combustion,
municipal solid waste, and geothermal energy, with solar and wind
After 2005, however, growth in
comprising a small percentage.
renewable energy-primarily wind power-increased significantly
with non-hydropower renewable energy in 2011 generating over five
percent of all electricity nationwide and well over ten percent in
several states.234
There are currently over 51,000 megawatts ("MWs") of installed
wind power in the United States, and this is beginning to have a
significant effect on transmission planning, particularly in the
Midwest, Texas, and the West where wind resources are most
significant. 2 In addition, there are significant but yet-undeveloped
wind resources in several other Midwestern and Interior West states,
including Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Montana, and Wyoming.2 11
232. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42 (2009); Barry Rabe, States on Steroids: The
IntergovernmentalOdyssey of American Climate Policy, 25 REV. POL'Y RES. 105, 106-108
(2008).
233. See Miriam Lydia Fischlein, Renewable Energy Deployment in the Electricity
Sector: Three Essays on Policy Design, Scope, and Outcomes 7-8 (Nov. 2010)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University
of
Minnesota),
http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99640/1/Fischlein_umn_0130E 11598.pdf.
234. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY 22 (Dec. 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current-year/december20l2.pdf (providing monthly
percentages); Frequently Asked Questions: What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy
Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3
(last updated June 26, 2012) (providing yearly percentages); Shares of Electricity
Generation from Renewable Energy Sources Up in Many States, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5750 (Apr. 9, 2012) (noting the
increased usage of renewable energy sources in individual states); see also Dan Seif, U.S.
Renewables Hit 5% ... Where's the Celebration?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (June 28,
2012), http:/Iblog.rmi.org/blog-USRenewablesHit_5-percent
(citing U.S. Energy
Information Administration data).
235. See 2012 U.S. Wind Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N,
http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industrystats/index.cfm (last updated Oct. 18, 2012).
236. See Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, Annual Report: Wind Power
Bringing Innovation, Manufacturing Back to American Industry (May 12, 2012),
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Annual-Report.cfm (reporting an increase
in wind power in various states as well as those states that have exceeded ten percent of
electricity derived from wind energy); State-Specific Wind Energy Fact Sheets, Updated
Through
the
3rd
Quarter
2012,
AM.
WIND
ENERGY
ASS'N,
http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications/factsheets/factsheetsstate.cfm; U.S. Installed
Wind Capacity Map, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wind-maps/installed-capacity-current.pdf;
Wind Speed Resource Map, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m-wind/USwind300dpe4-11.jpg; see also Klass & Wilson,
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At least thirty-eight states have adopted renewable portfolio
standards ("RPSs"), alternative energy portfolios, or voluntary goals
to spur additional renewable energy development, with significant
variation among which types of utilities are included, how they are
held accountable, and which resources "count" as renewable.
Typically, state RPSs require that by 2020 or 2030, fifteen to twenty
percent of electricity sold in the state must be produced from
renewable energy sources. Many states have additional policies to
promote renewable energy, such as renewable energy credits
("RECs"), 239 feed-in tariffs, tax incentives, and taxes.240
RECs allow utilities to fulfill their statutory obligations,
potentially at lower costs, by purchasing the "environmental benefit"
of renewable energy out of state. 241 RECs are tradable certificates
that create a separate market for the "environmental benefit" of
renewable energy.24 2 Some states allow utilities to purchase RECs to
fulfill their statutory obligations and meet their RPS requirements
from other states, while others require in-state renewable
generation.24 3 Since neighboring or nearby states may have lower cost
renewable development, utility-purchased RECs can have a
significant impact on renewable energy deployment in neighboring
states and drive the need for additional, interstate transmission
projects." For instance, even though Iowa does not have an RPS, it
ranks second in the nation for percentage of state power derived from
wind in part because wind generators in the state can sell RECs to
utilities in other states like Minnesota, which does have an aggressive

supra note 18, at 1827-47 (discussing wind energy capacity and installed wind capacity for
various states).
237. Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/renewableSOLUTIONS,
ENERGY
energy-standards (last updated Mar. 21, 2012); see also Davies, supra note 232, at 1375-90
(discussing the variations in current state RPSs); Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable
Portfolio Standards:Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Top"?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
& ENERGY L. 3, 13-16 (2011-12) (comparing the RPSs in several states); Fischlein, supra
note 233, at 7 (discussing policies at the state level for developing renewable energy).
238, Fischlein, supra note 233, at 7.
239. Id. at 29.
240. Eric Lipton & Clifford Krauss, Rich Subsidies Powering Solar and Wind Projects,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2011, at Al.
241. Fischlein, supra note 233, at 29.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1810-11 (discussing RECs and the impact of
various state RPSs on renewable energy development in neighboring states).
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RPS, thus creating a regional market for wind energy. 24 5 Nevertheless,
as discussed above, none of the benefits of this new, renewable
electricity generation can be realized without access to an expanded
transmission grid. 2 6
B.

The Rise of PrivateGeneratorsand Transmission Operators
As noted earlier, in 1978, Congress enacted PURPA, which
required utilities to purchase power from independent producers at
incentive rates. 24 7 One of Congress's goals in enacting the legislation
was to diversify the electricity market and support the growth of
renewable energy.' Congress required utilities to buy electricity
from these independent generators at the same rate that it would cost
the utilities to produce the power, known as the utility's "avoided
cost."249 In 1992, Congress sought to promote even greater
competition at the generator level and thus authorized FERC as part
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to require that utilities allow open
and nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid. 250 FERC
responded by promulgating Orders 888 and 889, which require
transmission-owning utilities to provide equal access to the
transmission system on a non-discriminatory basis and to share
transmission information to facilitate wholesale power transactions.25 1
In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 altered PURPA to
encourage utilities to provide net metering and other smart metering
practices to facilitate more distributed transmission, and required
245. Id. at 1832-34. Another factor apart from RECs that drives significant wind
development in Iowa is the generous wind production tax credit the state provides. Id. at
1834.
246. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing the need for an
expanded grid to bring renewable resources to population centers).
247. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2006); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456

U.S. 742, 750-51 (1982).
248. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 750-51.
249. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303 to 292.305 (2012); Frederick R.
Fucci, Distributed Generation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLES 349 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); see also Dworkin et al., supra note 119,
at 535 ("PURPA required utilities to buy power from independent companies, called
qualifying facilities (QFs), which could produce power for less than what it would have
cost for the utility to generate the power, called the 'avoided cost.' "); Jim Rossi, The
Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2010)
(discussing the "[u]se of federal law to expand the development of renewable sources of
electric power").
250. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2006)); Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 542.
251. Dworkin et al., supra note 119, at 542; see also Major Orders & Regulations, FED.
ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg.asp (last updated Apr. 1,
2013) (providing summary of each order and links to full text of the orders).
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utilities to provide interconnection services to any customer in that
utility's service area. 25 2 This created a market for private or
"merchant" transmission lines that compete with public utilities,
which historically owned and operated the transmission lines
throughout the country." The line between public and private
utilities is not always clear, and several states have granted
"transmission-only utility" status to private independent transmission
lines.254 Such lines may then earn a cost-based fee in the same manner
as a traditional public utility, but are thereby subject to greater
regulation than a merchant line.255 Today, approximately 500 private
and public entities own transmission facilities in the United States.
State-regulated, investor-owned utilities own sixty-six percent of
transmission assets; rural cooperatives and public power districts own
twenty-seven percent; and private merchant transmission companies
that finance and own transmission facilities independent of

252. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1251-1252, 119 Stat. 594, 963-67
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621, 2622, 2625, 2634, 2642 (2006)); Dworkin et al.,
supra note 119, at 536.
253. For a discussion of merchant transmission lines and efforts by FERC to promote
merchant transmission in general, see Werntz, supra note 7, at 424-25; see also id. at 425
n.13 ("Lacking captive customers, merchant transmission providers do not earn the
regulated, cost-based rate of return that captive customers would traditionally pay.
Instead, merchant transmission providers' compensation comes from contracts they sign
with customers to transmit electricity over their merchant transmission lines.").
254. See, e.g., Am. Transmission Co., No. 01-0142, 2003 WL 1995923 (Ill. C.C. Jan. 23,
2003) (illustrating that the Illinois Commerce Commission granted ATC, an independent
transmission company, the right to operate as a public utility, even though it did not
directly provide retail service to the public); Badger Coulee Transmission Line Project,
AM. TRANSMISSION Co., http://www.atc-projects.com/BadgerCoulee.shtml (last visited
Apr. 11, 2013) (describing ATC's Badger-Coulee Project, a 345-kV proposed line in
Wisconsin that would cost between $470 million and $500 million). Costs of the BadgerCoulee Project will be allocated to utility customers' electric bills based on the percentage
of energy used in each area. Ken Leiviska, Power Play: A TC Seeks Approval for Electrical
Transmission
Line,
REEDSBURG
TIMES-PRESS
(May
11,
2011),
http://www.wiscnews.com/news/local/article a77c8a7c-7bfe-lleO-8708-001cc4c002e0.html
(estimating the cost of the line to be about $425 million); Transcript of Town of Stark
Committee on Energy Planning & Information-Public Meeting with Representatives
from American Transmission Company (La Farge, WI, Mar. 24, 2011) (noting ATC's Lee
Meyerhofer's affirmation that ratepayers will pay a small portion of the cost of
transmission).
255. See supra note 254; see also Zephyr Power Transmission, LLC, 139 FERC
61,020, at PP 58-60 (2012) (waiving certain filing requirements for a merchant line
because it will be charging negotiated rates rather than cost-based rates and is thereby not
subject to FERC's cost-based data regulations).
256. NAT'L
GOVERNORS
ASS'N,
supra
note
101,
at
8,
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1201ENERGYTRANSMISSIONWP.PD
F.
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generation or customer-serving utilities own approximately four
percent.257
Merchant interstate transmission projects at various stages of
planning, approval, construction, and operation include: (1) the
completed Cross-Sound Cable, a twenty-four-mile, undersea
bidirectional high-voltage direct current cable between Connecticut
and Long Island, New York, completed in 2004;258 (2) the Montana
Alberta Tie Line ("MATL"), a 214-mile merchant line running
between Lethbridge, Alberta, and Great Falls, Montana, designed to
support development of the region's wind-energy potential with the
Montana portion complete and the Alberta portion in progress; 25 9 (3)
the Zephyr Transmission Project, now owned by Duke-ATC, a
proposed $3.5 billion, 1,100-mile, 500-kilovolt ("kV") line from
southeast Wyoming to Las Vegas, Nevada, largely through public
lands, with a 2020 proposed completion date;2 0 (4) the SunZia
Southwest Transmission Project, two proposed bi-directional 500-kV
lines intended to move 3,000 MW of energy through Arizona and
New Mexico, currently in the initial development phase and expected
to prompt significant growth in the states' renewable generation
markets;26 1 (5) the Rock Island Clean Line Energy project, a $2
billion, 500-mile, high-voltage direct current transmission line
designed to bring up to 3,500 MW of wind power in Iowa as well as
other generation in surrounding states to Illinois and other states to
the east, with construction expected to begin as early as 2014 and
power to run in 2017;262 and (6) the Texas Clean Energy Express, a
257. Id. at 8-9.
258. See Bruce Lambert, New York and ConnecticutAgree to End Cable Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES,
June
25,
2004,
at
B6;
CROSS-SOUND
CABLE
Co.,
LLC,
http://www.crosssoundcable.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
259. See Montana-Alberta Tie-Line (MATL)
Project, ENBRIDGE,
INC.,
http://enbridge.com/matl (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Timeline, ENBRIDGE, INC.,
http://enbridge.com/MATL/Timeline.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Wind Energy,
MONT. DEP'T COM., http://commerce.mt.gov/Energy/windenergy.mcpx (last visited Apr.
11,2013).
260. See Zephyr Power Transmission, LLC, 139 FERC 1 61,020, at PP 2-13 (2012);
Duke-American Acquires Zephyr Project for Wyoming Wind Power, WYo. ENERGY
NEWS (Jan. 4, 2012), http://wyomingenergynews.com/2012/01/duke-american-acquireszephyr-project-for-wyoming-wind-power/.
261. Project Schedule, SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net/schedule.php (last updated May
2012); SunZia Southwest Transmission Project, SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013); see also SunZia Transmission, LLC, 135 FERC 1 61,169, at 61,992
(2011) (authorizing the project).
262. FAQs, ROCK ISLAND CLEAN LINE, http://www.rockislandcleanline.com/site
/page/faqs (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Schedule, ROCK ISLAND CLEAN LINE,
http://www.rockislandcleanline.com/site/pagelschedule (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); see also
Benefits, ROCK ISLAND CLEAN LINE, http://www.rockislandcleanline.com/site
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200-mile, 345-kV transmission line built and operated by NextEra
Energy that, since becoming operational in 2009, brings 845 MW of
wind energy from Abilene, Texas, to Comfort, Texas, near load
centers in San Antonio.263
As discussed in Part II, virtually all states grant public utilities
the right to exercise eminent domain authority to build transmission
lines. 26 The states differ, however, as to whether they allow merchant
transmission lines to also exercise eminent domain authority.2 65 In
those states where merchant lines cannot exercise eminent domain
authority or where the law is unclear, it may be more difficult for
merchant lines to assemble the necessary land to build the line,
resulting in fewer interstate lines built in those states. The following
paragraphs and Appendix A provide a summary of the laws in each of
the fifty states with regard to whether they allow merchant lines to
exercise eminent domain authority.
/page/benefits (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (listing expected benefits of the project); Hannah
Northey, FERC Approves Iowa-to-Ill. Renewable Power Line, E&E NEWS (May 24, 2012),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/05/24/4 (announcing the line's approval). Other
Clean Line merchant transmission projects currently in the initial planning, environmental
review, and rate approval process include: (1) the Grain Belt Express Clean Line, a
proposed $2 billion, 700-mile line designed to deliver 3,500 MW of wind energy from
western Kansas to Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and other eastern states; (2) the Plains &
Eastern Clean Line, a proposed $2 billion, 700-mile line proposed to connect 7,000 MW of
energy from western Oklahoma, southwestern Kansas, and the Texas Panhandle to
Tennessee, Arkansas, and other locations in the mid-South and Southwest; and (3) the
Centennial West Clean Line, a proposed $2.5 billion, 900-mile line to connect 3,500 MW
of energy from New Mexico to Arizona and California and designed to enable more than
4,000 MW of new renewable energy to be built in that region. For the Grain Belt Express
Clean Line, see GRAIN BELT EXPRESS CLEAN LINE, http://www.grainbeltexpresscleanline
.com/site/home (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Project Description, GRAIN BELT EXPRESS
CLEAN LINE, http://www.grainbeltexpresscleanline.com/site/page/project-description (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013). For the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, see PLAINS & EASTERN
CLEAN LINE, http://www.plainsandeasterncleanline.com/site/home (last visited Apr. 11,
2013);
Project
Description,
PLAINS
&
EASTERN
CLEAN
LINE,
http://www.plainsandeasterneleanline.com/site/page/project-description (last visited Apr.
11, 2013). For the Centennial West Clean Line, see CENTENNIAL WEST CLEAN LINE,
http://www.centennialwestcleanline.com/site/home (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Project
Description, CENTENNIAL WEST CLEAN LINE http://www.centennialwestcleanline.com
/site/page/project-description (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
263. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1845-46 (discussing Texas Clean Energy
Express); Eileen O'Grady, FPL Builds Private Transmission Line in Texas, REUTERS
(Oct.
6,
2009),
http://www.reuters.comlarticle2009/10/26/utilities-wind-texasidUSN2620354820091026.
264. See supra note 95, 138 and accompanying text. Such grants of authority sometimes
include independent transmission companies that have been granted the right to act as a
public utility. See, e.g., Re ATC, Minn. Power and Superior Water Light & Power Co., No.
5-AE-200, 2011 WL 6740412, at *1 (Wis. P.S.C. Nov. 30, 2011) (defining ATC as a "public
utility").
265. See infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
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Many states grant eminent domain authority to merchant lines.
Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin have all granted merchant
transmission lines the right of eminent domain through statutes. 26 6
Kansas and Oklahoma lack specific statutory grants, but their public
utility commissions 6 7 have granted eminent domain powers to
merchant lines.268
266. For Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.522(12), 403.531(1), 403.539 (West 2008
& Supp. 2013) (permitting independent transmission companies or other transmission
organizations approved by FERC to be certified by the state to exercise eminent domain).
For Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.700(5), 278.714(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2003 &
Supp. 2012); id. § 416.130(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (the Kentucky Electric Generation &
Transmission Siting Board requires builders of a "nonregulated electric transmission line"
to obtain a construction certificate that includes information about land that will be taken
for the project, strongly suggesting the right of eminent domain). See generally KENTUCKY
STATE BOARD ON ELECTRIC GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION SITING, A GUIDE TO

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION http://pse.ky.gov/agencies/psc/siting-board/guide.pdf (describing
the siting application process). For Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 486.255
(West 2008) ("[An independent transmission company or an affiliated transmission
company shall have the power to condemn property that is necessary to transmit electric
energy for public use."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 460.569, 460.570(3) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1149 (West Supp. 2012); Electric
Transmission Line Certification Act, 2008 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 7216 (June 30, 2008). For
Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-101, 75-20-113 (2011); MATL LLP v. Salois,
2011 MT 126,
6-7, 360 Mont. 510, 511, 255 P.3d 158, 160 (Mont. 2011) (holding that
section 75-20-113 of the Montana code, as amended by H.B. 198, permitted MATL, a
"private merchant transmission line," to exercise eminent domain). For New Mexico,
which permits the New Mexico renewable energy transmission authority to exercise
eminent domain authority on behalf of private transmission projects where needed, see
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1-1, 62-1-4 (West 2003); id. §§ 62-16A-3, 62-16A-4(B)(8) (West
Supp. 2012); N.M. CODE R. § 17.8.3.10 (LexisNexis 2012), available at
http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/nmac/parts/titlel7/17.008.0003.pdf. For Oregon, see OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 758.015 (West 2007) (stating that "any transmission company"defined as anyone who owns or operates a high voltage transmission line and is subject to
FERC regulation-may petition the state PUC for condemnation rights). For Rhode
Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-2(13) (2006) (stating that an "electric transmission
company," defined as a company owning and/or operating transmission facilities which is
regulated by FERC but not as a public utility, "shall have the power of eminent domain
exercisable following a petition to the [PUC]"). For Vermont, which allows companies
under the jurisdiction of the public service board to exercise eminent domain and gives the
public service board jurisdiction over all companies engaged in transmission of electricity,
see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2(a)(7), 110 (2008); id. § 248(a)(2)(A-B) (Supp. 2012). For
Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.02(5)(b), 196.485(1)(d), 196.485(1)(dm) (West
2012) (stating that "independent transmission owner[s]" that are approved by FERC and
control transmission facilities in Wisconsin and another state "may acquire [land] by
condemnation").
267. The term "public utility commission" as used here is meant to include any public service
commission, corporation commission, or comparable administrative agency tasked with
regulation of energy transmission.
268. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-618 (2007); Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC, No. 11GBEE-624-COC
(Kan.
Corp.
Comm'n
Dec.
7,
2011),
available at
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Conversely, some states do not grant eminent domain authority
to merchant lines. Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Nebraska
expressly prohibit merchant transmission lines from exercising
eminent domain and clearly exclude such lines from general grants of
authority to public utilities.269 New York has an extremely specific
prohibition on eminent domain for intrastate merchant projects that
does not necessarily restrict eminent domain for interstate merchant
projects.270
http://estar.kcc.ks.gov/estar/ViewFile.aspx/20111207160045.pdf?Id=3a579188-df77-4d09b079-3de798a414a5 (granting public utility status to a Clean Line merchant transmission
project, thereby bringing the line within the statutory grant of eminent domain to public
utilities); Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC, PUD 201000075 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n Oct.
at
available
590530),
No.
(Order
2011)
28,
http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/Orders/0300D92C.pdf (granting public utility status to a
Clean Line merchant transmission project).
269. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(i) (2012) (stating that a "qualifying facility" includes
transmission lines that "directly and indirectly interconnect[| [with] electric utilities"). For
Illinois, see 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/3-105(b)(7), 5/8-406.1 (a), 5/8-509 (West 2011)
(stating that a "qualifying facilit[y]," as defined by PURPA, is not a public utility and thus
lacks eminent domain authority). For Maryland, see MD. CODE ANN. PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-207(b)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2012); Memorandum from the Md. Office of People's
Counsel to the Economic Matters Comm. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.opc.state.md.us/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=649JFgzoxuY%3D&tabid=138
(noting that only "electric companies" could build overhead transmission lines in
Maryland, and successfully supporting an amendment that would permit construction by a
"generator lead line," although it would not expand the right to build transmission lines to
merchant lines). For Nebraska, which permits only an "electric supplier," defined as a
"public power district,

..

. municipality,

...

or a cooperative," to exercise eminent domain,

see NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-301 (2009); id. §§ 70-1014.02(1)(a), 70-1014.02(6) (Supp. 2011);
id. § 76-710.04(3)(a) (2009); Deb Fischer, Senator Deb Fischer's Legislative Notes,
SANDHILLS EXPRESS (Mar. 19, 2010, 2:55 PM), http://www.sandhillsexpress.com
(arguing that
/BuySell/BuySellDetails/tabid/108/smid/384/ArticlelD/1500/Default.aspx
L.B. 1048 "clarifies wind power development in Nebraska"). For New Hampshire, see
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:1 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
270. N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1996); id. §§ 11(3-a), 11(7) (McKinney
1996 & Supp. 2013). In 2006, the right of eminent domain was withdrawn from a
"merchant transmission company" which (1) has built a line that begins and ends within
New York, (2) has testified that the line may increase electric rates, and (3) which has
applied for and been denied early designation as a National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridor. See id. § 11(7). The New York law arose in response to the controversial New
York Regional Interconnect ("NYRI") project, which would have moved energy from
upstate New York to New York City and surrounding population centers. Anthony
DePalma, Pataki Signs Bill Limiting the Use of Eminent Domain to Build High-Voltage
Power Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10
/04/nyregion/04power.html. The law was unambiguously intended to inhibit NYRI's use of
eminent domain. See id. The project's backers have since withdrawn their application. See
New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 126 FERC 1 61,320, at 62,741 (Mar. 31, 2009),
available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp (set the date ranges to
03/30/2009 and 04/01/2009 and set the docket number as "OA08-52-*"); Leslie Kaufman,
Consortium Drops Its Plan to Build New Power Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/business/energy-environment/04power.html.
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Other states might grant eminent domain authority to merchant
lines. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming have statutes that generally confer eminent
domain power to "power companies," companies engaged in
"transmission of electricity," "utilities," or similar entities, and define
these terms broadly enough that merchant transmission lines might be
included; however, no case law or administrative law firmly suggests
the state will or will not grant eminent domain to a merchant
transmission line.271 Statutes in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming suggest a greater likelihood that the states
would grant eminent domain authority. 27 2 Conversely, statutes in
California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, and Pennsylvania suggest a
weaker likelihood that the states would grant eminent domain
authority. 273 Arkansas and Connecticut lack specific statutory
prohibitions, but their public utility commissions or courts have
denied eminent domain powers to merchant lines. 274 Delaware limits
eminent domain powers of all electric transmission companies to
former railroad rights-of-way, public roads, canals, and highways.
Providing additional context for the information listed above, the
next Section details current controversies regarding eminent domain
authority for transmission lines in general and merchant lines in
particular.

271. For statutes, see infra Appendix A.
272. See infra Appendix A.
273. See infra Appendix A.
274. For Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-15-503(a), 18-15-503(b)(1) (2003 &
Supp. 2011); id. § 18-15-512 (2003); Plains & Eastern Clean Line, LLC, No. 10-041-U
(Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/10/10-041u_41_J.pdf. (denying public utility status to a Clean Line project, which was necessary for
it to exercise eminent domain). For Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1650x(b), 16-50z (West 2007); id. § 16-244p (West Supp. 2012); Conn. Light & Power Co. v.
Huschke, 409 A.2d 153, 155 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Transenergie U.S. Ltd., No. 00-06-14,
2000 WL 33121599, at *4 (Conn. Dep't Pub. Util. Control Oct. 18, 2000) (holding that
Transenergie was not an "electric distribution company," and as such, lacked the right of
eminent domain).
275. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 901,906-908 (2009).

2013]

TAKINGS AND TRANSMISSION

1127

C. CurrentDisputes over Eminent Domainfor Transmission Lines
Several particular issues have brought new focus to the question
of when transmission lines are a public use sufficient to justify
eminent domain authority: (1) the rise of merchant transmission lines;
(2) the backlash against the Supreme Court's Kelo decision; and (3)
state renewable energy goals requiring ambitious interstate
transmission projects, particularly in the Midwest and West. This
Section details several current controversies over public use and
transmission lines to set the stage for a more in-depth analysis of
these issues in Part IV.
1. Merchant Transmission Lines and Energy Destined
for Out-of-State Use
States continue to grapple with two questions concerning
merchant transmission lines: (1) the extent to which private
transmission companies-rather than public utilities-should be able
to exercise eminent domain authority for transmission lines and (2)
whether it matters if the energy is destined for in-state or out-of-state
use. For instance, in Montana, the state courts, legislature, governor,
and members of the public are embroiled in a controversy over the
Montana Alberta Tie Line, a 215-mile merchant transmission line
intended to transmit primarily wind energy from Great Falls,
Montana, to Alberta, Canada.276 Calgary-based Enbridge Energy
acquired the MATL from the project's original developer in October
2011.277 A few years earlier, in October 2008, the Montana
Department of Environmental Quality issued a Certificate of
Compliance for the line, and pursuant to existing law, MATL
commenced an eminent domain action to secure easements it was
unable to obtain through voluntary agreements. 278 A landowner
276. Mont. Alberta Tie, Ltd., 116 FERC 61,071, at 61,417 (July 20, 2006) (describing
the MATL line as a "merchant transmission project"); CONCERNED CITIZENS MONT.,
http://www.concernedcitizensmontana.net (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (illustrating public
sentiment against the MATL Project); Montana-Alberta Tie-Line (MATL) Project, supra
note 259.
277. NAW Staff, Enbridge Acquires Tonbridge, MATL Transmission Project, N.A. WIND
POWER (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.nawindpower.comel07_plugins/content/content.php
?content.8739.
278. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-30-102(37), 70-30-111 (2011); Montana Alberta Tie
Ltd., Certificate of Compliance (Mont. Dep't Envtl. Quality Oct. 22, 2008), available at
http://enbridge.com/MATL/-/media/www/Site%20Documents/Delivering%20Energy/Proj
ects/MATL/US/DEQ-DOE%20-%20Certificate%20of%20Compliance.ashx; JAMES A.
HOLTKAMP & MARK A. DAVIDSON, TRANSMISSION SITING IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (Aug. 2009), http://www.hollandhart

.com/articles/Transmission_Siting-WhitePaperFinal.pdf.
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opposed the eminent domain action, and in December 2010, a trial
court granted the landowner's motion to dismiss the condemnation
action on grounds that there was no specific statutory grant of
eminent domain power to a merchant transmission line. 9 MATL
appealed, and the Montana legislature simultaneously took up the
matter.20
Ultimately, in 2011, the state legislature enacted House Bill 198,
which clarified that transmission projects that receive a certificate and
are defined as a public use by statute may exercise eminent domain to
construct the facility authorized by the certificate.28 1 The bill was
controversial with Montana citizens, but it received bipartisan
legislative support and renewable energy nonprofit support 2 82 The
Montana Governor did not sign the bill on grounds that it failed to
adequately address landowner concerns, but a sufficient majority of
the legislature enacted it over the Governor's objection.' House Bill
198 explicitly stated that it applied retroactively to all projects that
had received a Major Facility Siting Act certificate after September
30, 2008, and thus applied to the MATL line.'
279. Perri Knize, Montana Court Finds Power Line Developer Has No Authority to
Condemn Private Land, INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT & POL'Y (Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, Arlington, Va.), Jan. 3, 2011, at 12, http://www.barrylepatner.com
/documents/LePatnerPDF.pdf; see also LeAnne Kavanagh, DistrictJudge Denies MA TL's
Claim of Eminent Domain, CUT BANK PIONEER PRESS (Dec. 15, 2010, 9:46 AM),
http://cutbankpioneerpress.com/articles/2010/12/15/cut-bank-pioneer-press/news/doc4d08
ed393db37475858638.txt (detailing the case and the judge's ruling).
280. See Act of May 9, 2011, ch. 321, 2011 Mont. Laws 1320 (clarifying the power of
eminent domain as it pertains to public utilities); MATL LLP v. Salois, 2011 MT 126,
T 3-7, 360 Mont. 510, 511-12, 255 P.3d 158, 159-60 (discussing the impact of H.B. 198).
281. See Act of May 9, 2011, §§ 1-2, 2011 Mont. Laws at 1320 (clarifying the power of
eminent domain as it pertains to public utilities); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-101(d) (2011)
(defining "public utility" to include every public or private entity which owns or controls
any plant or equipment to provide, among other things, "power in any form or by any
agency"); id. § 69-3-113 (granting any eminent domain authority to a "public utility" for a
"public use authorized by law"); id. § 70-30-102(37) (defining "public use[]" for purposes
of eminent domain authority to include "electrical energy lines"); id. § 75-20-113 ("A
person issued a certificate pursuant to this chapter may acquire by eminent domain any
interest in property, as provided in Title 70, chapter 30, for public use authorized by law to
construct a facility in accordance with the certificate."); MATL LLP, 2011 MT at 1 3-7,
360 Mont. at 511-12, 255 P.3d at 159-60 (discussing the impact of H.B. 198); Editorial,
Group Hails Power Bill, MONT. STANDARD (May 12, 2011, 12:15 AM),
http://mtstandard.com/news/opinionleditorial/group-hails-power-bill/articlef9f344987c22-lleO-87a5-00lcc4cOO2eO.html.
282. See Editorial, supra note 281.
283. Charles S. Johnson, Referendum Planned on Eminent Domain, MONT. STANDARD
(May 18, 2011, 12:15 AM), httpJ/mtstandard.com/news/local/referendum-planned-on-eminentdomain/articlebe8f67aO-8105-lleO-b310-001cc4c3286.html.
284. Act of May 9, 2011, §6, 2011 Mont. Laws at 1321. The MATL received a Major
Facility Siting Act Certificate on October 22, 2008. MA TL LLP, 2011 MT at 1 5, 360
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In June 2011, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the trial
court's determination that the line was not a public use and overruled
the decision in light of House Bill 198.285 In a separate lawsuit,
landowners sued the state and the transmission line company alleging
that the new eminent domain law was unconstitutional on due process
grounds and because it constituted "special legislation."" The district
court rejected these claims in January 2012.287 Notably, in speaking
with reporters, the plaintiffs "questioned the logic of allowing a
Canadian company to condemn private property in the United
States."' The landowner disputes have resulted in significant
additional costs and delays for the project. 28 9 The American Wind
Energy Association estimates that Montana has the second-largest
wind power potential in the country behind Texas but that only a
small amount of wind power capacity has been installed in the state,
primarily because of inadequate transmission capacity.290
In Nebraska, the state legislature took the opposite approach to
that of Montana. It made clear that private entities do not have
eminent domain authority for such lines. Prior to 2010, Nebraska law
was not supportive of any private renewable energy generation or
transmission projects, and policies favored the regulated public power
system.29 1 In 2010, the legislature enacted a bill that created new
incentives for private renewable energy generation developers to
build facilities that would export electricity out of the state. 292 The law
provides that only public power entities may exercise eminent domain
in the construction of transmission lines which will serve private
Mont. at 512, 255 P.3d at 160; Charles S. Johnson, New Eminent Domain Law Challenged,
MONT. STANDARD (May 21, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://mtstandard.comlnews/state-andregional/new-eminent-domain-law-challenged/article276c5d74-8367-1 leO-aba7001cc4cG3286.html.
285. MATL LLP, 2011 MT at 1 6-7, 360 Mont. at 512,255 P.3d at 160.
286. See Complaint at 11-14, Maurer Farms, Inc. v. Montana, No. DV-11-024 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. May 20, 2011), http://www.concernedcitizensmontana.net/Publish/Complaint.pdf; Johnson,
supra note 284.
287. See generally Maurer Farms, Inc. v. Montana, Cause No. DV-11-024 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 11, 2012) (analyzing and rejecting these claims).
288. See Scott Streater, Mont. Eminent Domain Ruling Inches Power Line Project Toward
Completion, E&E NEWS: LAND LETTER (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.eenews.net1Landletter
12012/01/19/6.
289. Dina O'Meara, Power Line Slowed by Cash Crunch; Montana Link Faces $5.8M
Shortfall, CALGARY HERALD (June 28, 2011), https://www.wind-watch.org/news
/2011/06/28/power-line-slowed-by-cash-crunch-montana-link-faces-5-8m-shortfall/.
290. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND ENERGY FACTS: MONTANA (2012),
www.awea.org/learnabout/publications/upload/4Q-11-Montana.pdf; Streater, supra note
288.
291. See Fischer,supra note 269.
292. Act of Apr. 12,2010, L.B. 1048,2010 Neb. Laws 773,774,776.
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energy generation facilities; the statute expressly notes that
"[njothing in this section shall be construed to grant the power of
eminent domain to a private entity."29 3 This policy reflected the
drafters' desire to create a compromise between private wind
generators and the public power system. 29 4 Private merchant
transmission groups were not considered. Thus, while Nebraska
expressed a policy in favor of exporting renewable energy from the
state, it did not want to grant eminent domain authority to private
parties, as opposed to public utilities, in connection with building the
related transmission lines.
Legislators in Idaho are similarly concerned with the use of
eminent domain for merchant transmission companies wishing to
build lines to transport energy out of state. Public uses in Idaho for
eminent domain authority are defined by statute and include
"[e]lectric distribution and transmission lines for the delivery,
furnishing, distribution, and transmission of electric current for
power, lighting, heating or other purposes."2 95 In 2011, members of
the Idaho House of Representatives introduced House Bill 268 in
response to several proposed merchant transmission lines designed to
reach electricity markets in Arizona, California, and Nevada.29 6 The
bill provided that entities that were not public utilities, electric
cooperatives, or municipalities could not condemn land for
transmission lines unless the developer established that the project
"materially serves the interests of the citizens of Idaho." 297 Although
the bill did not pass, this effort illustrates public concern over the
potential for the exercise of eminent domain authority by private

293. Id.; NEB. REv. STAT. § 70-1014.02(6) (Supp. 2011).
294. See Fischer, supra note 269 (discussing the viewpoints of the private and public
stakeholders involved in the legislation); Press Release, Rembolt Ludtke LLP, Passage of
LB 1048 Fosters Development of Wind Energy in Nebraska (Apr. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.prlog.org/10642305-passage-of-lb-1048-fosters-development-of-wind-energyin-nebraska.html (noting that one of the drafters of the bill had the initial idea of creating
a public-private partnership between public power companies and private wind
companies).
295. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701(11) (2010).
296. See H.B. 268, 61st Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2011), available at
see, e.g., Project Overview,
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2011/HO268.pdf;
GATEWAY W. TRANSMISSION LINE PROJECT, http://www.gatewaywestproject.com/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013) (providing information on the proposed transmission line project by
Rocky Mountain Power and Idaho Power); Geoffrey Talmon, Idaho Senate Puts Off
Decisions on Eminent Domain Bills, IDAHO BLAWG (Apr. 10, 2011),
http://blog.talmonlaw.com/?p=6 (stating that H.B. No. 268 would have a significant impact
on the Gateway West Transmission Line Project).
297. H.B.268.
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transmission companies as efforts to develop renewable energy in
western states and build associated transmission continue. 298
2. State Concerns over Eminent Domain Authority for RPS and
Other Renewable Energy Goals
With RPS mandates in place in states across the country, there
are concerns that governments and private parties may attempt to
take advantage of existing, expansive eminent domain authority for
power generation and transmission to meet those goals. Some states
are thus creating new limits on historic eminent domain authority.
For instance, in Wyoming, state statutes grant eminent domain
authority to both public utilities and private companies that own
transmission lines. 29 9 However, Wyoming expressly denies eminent
domain authority to public utilities and private companies alike for
the construction of wind farms."o In recent years, there has been
298. See Talmon, supra note 296 (noting that the legislature adjourned prior to the
Senate taking any action on House Bill 268); supra notes 206-19 and accompanying text;
see also Act of Oct. 3, 2006, ch. 741, § 1, 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws 3702, 3702 (codified at N.Y.
TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 11(7) (McKinney Supp. 2013)) (prohibiting the use of eminent
domain by power companies intending to transfer power out of New York or raise
electrical rates); H.B. 648, 2012 Leg., 162d Gen. Court, 2d Sess. (N.H. 2012) (codified at
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:1 (2008 & Supp. 2012)) (restricting the use of eminent
domain by public utility companies to take private property); New Hampshire Eminent
Domain Rules Tightened, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD
(Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.pressherald.com/news/n-h_-eminent-domain-rules-tightened_2012-03-06.html
(discussing the impact that House Bill 648 will have, including blocking a power project
known as the "Northern Pass").
299. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815(a) (2011); ABIGAIL M. JONES, WIND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND EMINENT DOMAIN IN WYOMING: WHO HAS THE "POWER"? 3
(2011),
http://www.buddfalen.com/content/2-Landowners%20and%20Energy
%20Development/A.%20%2OWind%201ease%20negotiation/Article%20%20Wind%2OEnergy%20Development%20and%20Eminent%2Domain%20in%2Wy
oming.pdf discussing the availability of eminent domain to private companies in erecting
transmission lines). Notably, although public utilities in Wyoming must obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity prior to exercising eminent domain authority for a
transmission line, electricity wholesalers and other private entities building transmission
lines need not obtain a certificate prior to exercising statutory eminent domain authority.
See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-205(a) (2011) (requiring any public utility to obtain a
certificate prior to "construction of a line, plant or system"); id. § 1-26-815 ("Any person,
association, company or corporation ... may appropriate by condemnation a way of
necessity over, across or on so much of the lands or real property of others as necessary for
the location, construction, maintenance and use of ... electric power transmission and
distribution systems."); Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108,
31, 118 P.3d 996, 1011 (Wyo. 2005) (holding that electricity wholesaler was not a public
utility and thus did not need to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
prior to exercising eminent domain authority to build transmission line).
300. See JONES, supra note 299, at 2. See generally WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26-501 to 817 (2011) (encompassing the entirety of the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act).
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controversy in Wyoming over whether the state should grant eminent
domain authority for the small transmission lines (a.k.a. collector
systems) that transmit power directly from a wind farm to a large
transmission line.30 ' This is because, in 2010, the Wyoming Legislature
amended the State Eminent Domain Act to create a statewide
moratorium on allowing land for collector systems to be
condemned."* This moratorium was enacted because there was
considerable public opposition to the state's broad grant of power
relating to wind energy development.30 3 The legislature wanted to halt
all eminent domain projects while it reviewed its policies.3 * The
moratorium was scheduled to end in June 2011, but was extended in
2011 until 2013.105
Colorado has also considered how far eminent domain authority
should extend to meet new renewable energy goals. In 2010, the
Colorado legislature amended its statutes to require certain providers
of retail electricity in the state, known as "qualifying retail utilities"
("QRUs"), to generate thirty percent of their electricity from
renewable resources by 2020.30 This increased need for renewable
energy is naturally expected to result in a corresponding need for new
transmission lines. Colorado law also provides that any corporation
formed for the purpose of constructing an electric line has the power
of eminent domain. 307 However, a separate Colorado statute enacted
with the state's first RPS in 2005 provides that a QRU does not have
the power of eminent domain "to site the generation facilities of a

301. See JONES, supra note 299, at 3-4; see also WYOMING WIND ENERGY TASK
FORCE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR, 60th Legis., Gen. Sess., at 6-7
(2010), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/Isoweb/Wind%20Energy/Documents/WETF%20Final
%20Report.pdf (discussing what constitutes a collector system and when it is appropriate
to use eminent domain for these systems).
302. See Act of Mar. 5, 2010, ch. 48, § 1, 2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws 232, 232-33 (putting a
moratorium into effect until June 30, 2011); JONES, supra note 299, at 4 (discussing the
reasoning behind the moratorium).
303. See JONES, supra note 299, at 4.
304. See Act of Mar. 5, 2009, ch. 159, § 348, 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws 526, 526-27 (creating
a task force to study aspects of the wind energy industry); JONES, supra note 299, at 4
(discussing the findings of the task force).
305. See Act of Mar. 2, 2011, ch. 86, § 1, 2011 Wyo. Sess. Laws 173, 173 (extending the
moratorium until June 30, 2013).
306. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I)(E) (2012).
307. See id. §38-1-202(2)(1) (providing statutory authorization for any corporation that is
formed to construct electrical lines); id. § 38-2-101(1) (authorizing any corporation that is formed
to construct electrical lines through condemnation); see also id. § 38-5-105 (granting power of
eminent domain to transmission companies and electric light power companies).
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renewable energy system used in whole or in part to meet the electric

resource standards." 3 08
There is thus a question over whether the 2005 limits on eminent
domain authority relating to meeting the state RPS may hamper
efforts to use eminent domain for transmission lines within the
state. 30 At this point, although the separate statutory eminent domain
authority for transmission lines would appear to remain intact, issues
may arise over (1) whether the transmission line is "sufficiently
distinct from the generation facility it interconnects"; (2) whether a
new renewable energy project falls within the statutory eminent
domain limits if the QRU has already exceeded the state RPS; and
(3) whether the statute has any effect on interstate power producers
or other companies who sell power wholesale and thus are not
QRUs.'
As new interstate transmission projects develop in
Colorado to meet the state RPS as well as improve the regional
transmission system in general, these eminent domain limitations will
likely be highly relevant to any disputes.
The Wyoming and Colorado examples show states revisiting
their eminent domain laws to carve out new limits on what was
historically very extensive authority granted to public utilities and
others to take private property for energy generation and
transmission purposes. While states may wish to encourage the
development of renewable energy through RPSs and other incentives,
they appear to be less comfortable granting the same blanket eminent
domain authority to the energy industry (whether public utilities or
private parties) than in years past. This shift can be attributed in part
to the impact of Kelo and the increased attention now given to
eminent domain across the board. It can also be attributed to the
much more complicated landscape of electricity generation and
transmission that now exists throughout the country. Part IV
considers these fundamental changes in law, policy, and the electric
transmission system and attempts to provide some guidance for states
in developing eminent domain laws that will further the states' policy
goals surrounding electricity development and transmission.
308. Id § 40-2-125; see also Jaclyn K. Casey, Can a QRU Take from You? Restrictions
on Using Eminent Domain for Renewable Energy Projects, ROTHGERBER JOHNSON &
LYONS
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.rothgerber.comlshowarticle.aspx?Show=1377
(discussing the limitations and uncertainty surrounding the use of eminent domain by
QRUs).
309. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 308 (discussing the uncertainty over whether eminent
domain can be used to construct transmission lines to connect a renewable energy source
to the grid).
310. Id.
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IV. DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES TO EMINENT DOMAIN FOR
TRANSMISSION LINES
As an initial matter, in most states, whether public utilities can
use eminent domain authority for transmission lines is not subject to
significant dispute.3 1t The majority of states have statutory or
constitutional provisions stating expressly that transmission lines are a
public use and can exercise eminent domain. 12 While some states
limit that authority to public utilities, many do not, in which case
there is less of a role for a court to determine public use, depending
on how the statute is worded. 13 Notably, eminent domain actions for
transmission lines, railroads, and other privately developed
infrastructure'projects are more easily described as "private takings"
than the traditional economic development takings criticized as a
result of Kelo. This is because in traditional economic development
takings, like the one in Kelo, a governmental body is at least bringing
the condemnation action in its own name after a public review prior
to transferring the property to a private party. By contrast, in a
transmission line taking or other private infrastructure taking, it is a
private party rather than any government entity that initiates the
taking in its own name.
Nevertheless, even though one can argue that transmission line
takings resemble private takings because of the party initiating the
action, the fact remains that virtually all states allow public utilities,
private transmission companies, or both to exercise the power of
eminent domain for these reasons.314 Yet as was made clear in the
years immediately following Kelo, public opinion can turn quite
quickly in this area. Thus, it is certainly possible that a sympathetic
plaintiff in a transmission line case, particularly a merchant line
sending power out-of-state, could galvanize opposition to the use of
eminent domain for such projects and result in many states revising
their statutes and constitutions. Indeed, Part III illustrates that some
states are already starting to reconsider this historically broad grant of
authority.315 Accordingly, the remainder of this Part puts aside the
existing state statutes and constitutions that declare transmission lines
a public use and considers ways in which the federal government and
states can best ensure existing law supports the development of new,
311.
domain
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra notes 95, 138 and accompanying text (illustrating widespread eminent
authority for transmission lines).
See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
See supra Part III.C.
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interstate lines, subject to appropriate economic and environmental
review.
Section A begins with a discussion of federal preemption of state
siting authority, and how the Natural Gas Act, which authorizes
federal siting approval and eminent domain authority for interstate
natural gas pipelines, might serve as precedent for transferring
approval and siting authority for interstate transmission lines from
the states to the federal government. This Section recognizes,
however, that while the federal model exists, the likelihood of such a
transfer of authority over transmission lines from the states to the
federal government at the present time is unlikely. Thus, the
remainder of this Part discusses what actions states can take on their
own to facilitate the development of interstate lines. It first considers
the question of "public use" in the context of lines designed to bring
power primarily to out-of-state customers, drawing connections
between the disputes in this area with the controversy that arose after
Kelo. It then specifically considers the question of merchant lines and
whether such lines should be able to exercise eminent domain.
A.

FederalPreemptionof State Siting Authority and the Natural Gas
Act
As discussed in Part II, the problem with a single state
determining whether an interstate transmission line is a public use for
purposes of authorizing eminent domain authority is that a single
state legislature or state court must focus primarily on the citizens of
its own state. 6 If the United States had a regional or national system
for siting transmission lines rather than a state system, however, this
would not be an issue at all."' If Congress were to expand the
Department of Energy's ("DOE") and FERC's authority in this area,
or grant plenary authority to FERC to site interstate transmission
lines, the public use question would be quite different. In that case,
the "public" would be defined on a regional or national basis, and
eminent domain could be justified without concern for which state
residents stand to benefit. Using that model, a transmission line
would receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity from
FERC after a review of the economics and environmental impact of

316. See supra Part II.B.

317. See infra note 322 and accompanying text (discussing very limited federal
authority to site transmission lines on state and private lines if the Department of Energy
designates a National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor).
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the line and input from state and local governments and the public. 3 18
The line would have a federal siting permit as well as federal eminent
domain authority that would override any state law to the contrary.319
Such federal siting authority that preempts state authority is the
model that has existed for decades for interstate natural gas pipelines
under the Natural Gas Act.320 This would address the "public use"
concerns inherent in today's state-based system, eliminate the
patchwork of siting and eminent domain authority across the country,
and avoid the need to obtain siting approval from multiple states, thus
streamlining the process significantly. 321
Today, however, as noted earlier, the only authority the federal
government possesses to site electric transmission lines off federal
lands is contained in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which grants the
DOE authority to identify National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors ("NIETCs") in areas of the country experiencing
transmission constraints or congestion.322 Once the DOE identifies a
NIETC, FERC has authority to exercise backstop siting authority to
site the line if the states through which the line will pass cannot or will
not site the line within a specified time period.3 23 The federal courts,
however, have interpreted the DOE's and FERC's authority under
this law quite narrowly, with the result being that the DOE has not
successfully designated a NIETC, and FERC has not exercised its
backstop siting authority. 324

318. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1865-67 (using the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 as a model for balancing local and national interests in siting cell phone towers).
319. See id. at 1859-60.
320. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)-(h) (2006) (requiring certificate of public convenience and
necessity); see also Klass & Wilson, supra 18, at 1865-67 (discussing the Natural Gas Act
and FERC authority for siting interstate natural gas pipelines and grant of eminent
domain authority).
321. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 19, at 28-32 (recommending that
Congress enact legislation granting FERC enhanced siting authority for certain interstate
transmission lines that would preempt state decisions on such lines); Rossi, supra note 20,
at 1026 (recognizing that interconnectedness was not the focus when siting authorities
were created and that the system would almost certainly be different if it were established
today).
322. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221, 119 Stat. 594, 946-51
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006)) (discussing DOE authority to designate NIETCs).
323. See id. (discussing FERC backstop authority).
324. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir.
2011) (vacating the designation of NIETCs); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d
304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009) (invalidating the FERC rule on backstop siting authority), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1138 (2010). See generally Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1817-21,
1859-65 (discussing limited federal authority over transmission siting off federal lands).
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There would be drawbacks, of course, to federalizing the
transmission siting system. A centralized system would make it more
difficult for states and local governments to impose siting conditions
to protect local economic and environmental interests. 325 It may also
be more difficult in some cases for individual landowners and local
environmental groups to participate in the process and ensure that
their concerns are addressed. Indeed, environmental groups in
particular are often conflicted with regard to new interstate
transmission lines.326 Many environmental groups favor new lines,
along with wind and solar generation development in general, so long
as these projects will expand the use of renewable energy27 Other
environmental groups, however, are more concerned with the local
environmental impacts of these developments on scenic, aesthetic,
biological, and animal resources, regardless of any positive climaterelated impacts or other benefits associated with renewable energy.328
These concerns notwithstanding, a more streamlined federal-or
even regional-siting authority would facilitate the development of
new interstate transmission lines for increased renewable energy
integration, grid reliability, and other purposes.2 In other related
areas such as liquefied natural gas terminals and cell phone towers,
Congress has recently shifted some authority to federal agencies to
site these projects in the face of state and local resistance to such
projects.3 30 Both of these frameworks are potential models for
interstate transmission lines.3 However, the current political climate
does not bode well for a shift toward greater federal authority for
interstate transmission lines.332 While there have been numerous

325. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1859-60 (discussing state preemption
provisions of the National Gas Act).
326. See Alexandra B. Klass, Energy & Animals: A History of Conflict, 3 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 159, 196-97 (2011-12) (discussing conflicts among environmental
groups over whether to support or oppose renewable energy-related projects).
327. See id. (recognizing support for renewable energy development among
environmental groups due to its potential for reducing greenhouse gases).
328. See id. at 197 (referencing litigation by environmental groups challenging
renewable energy development due to its potential effects on habitats); Rossi, supra note
20, at 1021-22.
329. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 19, at 28-32; Klass & Wilson, supra
note 18, at 1859-67 (explaining the benefits of federal siting authority as seen in the areas
of natural gas terminals and cell phone towers).
330. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1860-67 (discussing increased federal
authority in these areas).
331. See id.
332. See id. at 1820-21, 1862-64 (discussing failed congressional attempts to create
more federal authority for transmission line siting and comparing state-based siting system
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congressional efforts to expand FERC's siting authority for interstate
transmission lines in recent years, none have succeeded so far.333 As a
result, the disputes will continue over public use for interstate
transmission lines that do not directly serve residents of all states
through which the lines pass. This makes it even more important for
the states to ensure that their laws governing eminent domain
authority for interstate transmission lines reflect their energy policy
preferences regarding the import and export of electricity and
particularly renewable electricity. The remainder of this Part thus
focuses on the states.
B. State Policiesto FacilitateDevelopment of InterstateLines
As noted earlier, today's political climate makes it unlikely that
Congress will shift any significant authority from the states to the
federal government for interstate transmission siting.3 34 As a result, it
is important to focus on what actions states can take on their own to
facilitate the development of new, interstate transmission lines. Such
actions include: (1) broadening the scope of public use determinations
to include regional benefits to the transmission grid and electricity
markets; and (2) expressly extending the same eminent domain
authority to merchant transmission lines that exists for lines built by
public utilities, so long as the state has in place a rigorous certificate
of need process for both types of lines.
1. State Consideration of Out-of-State Uses and Benefits in
Determining Public Use
As discussed in Part II, for decades, state courts have taken
varying approaches regarding whether a transmission line designed to
exclusively or primarily bring power to out-of-state customers is a
"public use" for eminent domain purposes.3 This raises an initial
question of how to define "the public." To the extent the public is
defined exclusively as state residents, it is easier for courts to
conclude that there is no public use for the line if no state residents
will be able to use or benefit from the line. This is the approach that
for interstate transmission lines with federal siting system for interstate natural gas
pipelines).
333. See id. at 1820-21 (describing the attempts of FERC and the House of
Representatives to pass new legislation expanding FERC authority in 2005 and 2009
respectively).
334. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text (discussing recent, failed
congressional efforts to shift some transmission siting authority from the states to the
federal government).
335. See supra Part II.B.
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3
the courts in Mississippi 3 and Floridam
' have historically taken,
making it difficult for either public utilities or private lines to take
advantage of eminent domain authority to build interstate lines.
However, courts in other states, such as North Dakota3 and
Indiana,"' have taken a broader view of what constitutes public use,
focusing on regional benefits, the benefits to in-state residents of grid
reliability generally, and the economic benefits to the state that may
be generated from the export of electricity.34 0

336. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984) (blocking
a power company's efforts to use eminent domain to build a line between Louisiana and
Mississippi because Mississippi residents would not receive power from the line). It is
unclear whether the court would have viewed the line more favorably if some of the power
had been designated for Mississippi customers even if Louisiana remained the primary
beneficiary, but the court "seemed to suggest that some sort of balancing would have to be
applied before eminent domain could be exercised in the Magnolia state." See Brown &
Daniels, supra note 221, at 27.
337. See Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1967) (rejecting state
utility's petition because it failed to sufficiently allege any specific public benefit or
purpose as required by Florida law to justify its proposed eminent domain takings to build
a one-way transmission line from Florida to Georgia that would provide power to Georgia
customers but "from which the citizens of Florida [would] not derive one iota of benefit").
338. See Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 530 (N.D. 1976) (holding
that a one-way transmission line from North Dakota to Minnesota served a public use
when all the benefits-including the possibility of future use by the public, increased
reserve supplies, stabilization of the grid, and lower cost power-were considered together
instead of separately).
339. See Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co., 423 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(upholding eminent domain taking by public utility because of a "present need for this
transmission line to insure the reliability of [the provider's] network system of distribution
and the stability of [its] generating station"). Even though most of the electricity produced
would go to Illinois customers, the court noted that Indiana's legislature had "expressly
granted the power of eminent domain to [the utility] to furnish electricity to the 'public'
not to Indiana residents alone." Id. at 617; see also Shedd v. Pub. Serv. Co., 188 N.E. 322,
326 (Ind. 1934) (holding that a project that benefits out-of-state residents in addition to instate residents does not cease to be a public use).
340. See, e.g., Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Beecher, 256 P.3d 1008, 1012 (Okla. Civ. App.
2010) (analogizing an interstate transmission line to an interstate highway and concluding
that even though Oklahoma customers would not be the primary users of electricity from
an interstate transmission line, they were the "primary intended beneficiaries" of the line
since it would increase "the availability of more reliable, efficient, and economical
electricity"); Stone v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 162 A.2d 18, 21, 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)
(emphasizing the importance of integrating the transmission systems of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and Baltimore, Maryland, to allow each system to "be able to meet,
adequately and safely, its varying and growing load demands, and to maintain constant
voltage, frequency stability, and reliability of service" and also explaining that the
electricity was needed because "the area to be served include[d] oil refineries, ship
building, steel production, and other industries vital to the nation's peacetime economy
and national defense"); Grice v. Vt. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 2008 VT 64, 1 20, 956 A.2d 561,
571 (Vt. 2008) (recognizing that a line that would be part of the Northwest Reliability
Project served a public use, and that the nature of the integrated grid system makes it
impossible to guarantee that a particular line will serve state residents). See generally
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Notably, this debate strongly resembles the "use by the public"
versus "public purpose" debate arising out of Kelo. For the courts in
Mississippi and Florida, the fact that the transmission line would not
be providing electricity immediately to in-state residents meant that
there was no "use by the public" and thus no public use to justify
eminent domain, consistent with Justice Thomas's dissent in Kelo.3 41
For the courts in North Dakota and Indiana, by contrast, the line
could more easily establish a public use by showing the regional
economic and grid reliability benefits associated with the line, which
is more analogous to the "public purpose" analysis in the Kelo
majority opinion.3 42
These doctrinal differences among the states become more
significant as the electricity grid becomes increasingly interstate in
nature-both as an engineering matter, due to the existence of more
interstate lines, and from a policy perspective, given the desire to
encourage competition. Especially regarding policy, the federal
government and many states now expressly focus on regional benefits
to make decisions regarding the expansion of the transmission grid.
For instance, in 2011, FERC issued Order 1000, which requires
transmission providers to consider state "public policy requirements"
(e.g., state RPSs) in regional transmission planning efforts.3 43
Sandeep Vaheesan, PreemptingParochialismand Protectionismin Power,49 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 87, 99 (2012) (discussing the benefits of increasing the capacity of the transmission
system, including "(1) enhanced system reliability; (2) decreased energy costs due to more
efficient generation dispatch and greater market competition; (3) increased fuel diversity;
and (4) reduced emissions of air pollutants-that are often regional in nature").
341. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas relies on historical originalism and a strict textualist construction of the
Fifth Amendment to argue that the Framers intended a narrow interpretation for what
constitutes "public use." Id. at 507. He vehemently rejects the majority's abandonment of
this standard in favor of the broader "public purpose" doctrine, which he contends is
historically unsupported and difficult to apply, arguing that "[o]nce one permits takings
for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent principle limits what could
constitute a valid public use." Id. at 517.
342. See id. at 479-80 (majority opinion) (explaining the Court's shift away from a
strict public use test toward a "broader and more natural" public purpose framework
because the former "proved to be impractical given the diverse and evolving needs of
society").
343. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,876 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring "public utility transmission providers to amend their
OATTs to describe procedures that provide for the consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements in the local and regional transmission planning
processes"); see also FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ORDER No. 1000 FACTS
(2011), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2011/2011-3/07-21-11-E-6-factsheet.pdf
("Each public utility transmission provider must establish procedures to identify
transmission needs driven by public policy requirements and evaluate proposed solutions
to those transmission needs."). But see JAMES HEIDELL & SANDRA RINGELSTETTER
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Likewise, the Midwest Independent System Operator ("MISO"),
which oversees the electricity grid for eleven Midwestern states, also
considers "public policy" benefits in determining which transmission
projects in the MISO region are "multi-value" projects subject to
broader cost allocation across the region."
Moreover, in addition to the supreme courts of North Dakota
and Indiana, which have articulated a more regional approach to
public use and public benefit, several states have enacted statutes in
recent years that specifically direct their state PUCs to consider
regional benefits or general economic benefits in reviewing proposed
transmission lines. For instance, in 2007, New Mexico enacted a law
specifically to facilitate interstate transmission corridors within the
state. 345 The law directs the state's Renewable Energy Transmission

ENNIS, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, FERC ORDER 1000 & PUBLIC POLICY
TRANSMISSION PROJECTS 3-4 (2012), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUBFERC
_Order_1000_0412.pdf (cautioning that FERC Order No. 1000's public policy requirement
rule provides no clear definition of how public benefits should be calculated and risks
making it more difficult to reach consensus amongst stakeholders). In response to these
concerns, FERC eventually clarified that
we are not requiring that any federal or state laws or regulations themselves be
considered as part of the transmission planning process.... Our intent is that
public utility transmission providers consider such transmission needs just as they
consider transmission needs driven by reliability or economic concerns. We are not
requiring that public utility transmission providers do any more than that.
FERC Order No. 1000-A, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,217 (May 31, 2012) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
344. See MIDWEST INDEP. SYSTEM OPERATOR, MULTI-VALUE PROJECT PORTFOLIO:
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 3 (2011), https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository
/Study/Candidate%20MVP%20Analysis/MVP%20Portfolio%20Analysis%20Full%20Re
port.pdf (stating that "[plublic policy decisions over the last decade have driven changes in
how the transmission system is planned" and highlighting how "[t]he recent adoption of
Renewable Portfolio standards (RPS) and clean energy goals [by states] across the MISO
footprint have driven the need for a more regional and robust transmission system to
deliver renewable resources from often remote renewable energy generators to load
centers"). But see Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)
(invalidating pro rata cost allocation rule for high-voltage transmission lines within the
PJM RTO on grounds that the relationship between the benefits transmission owners
would receive and the costs they would bear was too attenuated and thus invalid under the
FPA); see also Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1871 (suggesting that the Seventh
Circuit's holding may not be as unfriendly toward FERC's public policy requirement rule
as it initially appears because, "as Judge Posner['s majority opinion] noted, all that is
required is 'an articulable and plausible reason to believe that the benefits are at least
roughly commensurate with those utilities' share of total electricity sales' " (quoting Ill
Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at 477)).
345. Renewable Energy Transmission Authority Act, ch. 3, 2007 N.M. Laws 125
(codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16A (Supp. 2012)).

1142

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Authority ("RETA") to participate in regional transmission forums346
and grants it the power of eminent domain to acquire property or
rights of way for public use if needed for regional transmission
projects.347 RETA's website highlights the ample renewable resources
in the state and declares that New Mexico "can develop a major
renewable energy industry thereby creating permanent jobs,
protecting the environment, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and
furthering the nation's goals toward a sustainable and clean energy
resource for generations to come."3 48 Likewise, the Wyoming
legislature created the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority to
"diversify and expand the Wyoming economy through improvements
in the state's electricity transmission infrastructure and to facilitate
the consumption of Wyoming energy."" The Authority can plan,
own, develop, and maintain infrastructure within and outside of
Wyoming to accomplish its purpose and acquire property by
condemnation for those purposes.5 0
In creating the North Dakota Transmission Authority, the North
Dakota legislature cited economic development as its main purpose
since most of the findings establishing the Authority emphasize the
economic benefits of increasing transmission capacity."' The statute
states that developing North Dakota's lignite coal and wind resources
will "stabilize and increase revenues to the state"3 5 2 and "increas[e]
employment

...

and

improv[e]

the state's

economy";"'

that

"[t]ransmission constraints impede the development of the state's
lignite and wind resources";354 and that an "essential governmental
function and public purpose is to assist with the removal of electric
transmission export constraints ... to facilitate the development of
the state's abundant natural resources."35 5 By contrast, the rationale
346. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16A-4b(6) (Supp. 2012) ("The authority may ... through
participation in appropriate regional transmission forums, coordinate, investigate, plan,

prioritize and negotiate with entities within and outside the state for the establishment of
interstate transmission corridors.").
347. Id. § 62-16A-4b(8) ("The authority may ... pursuant to the provisions of the
[state's] Eminent Domain Code, exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring
property or rights of way for public use if needed for projects . . .").
348. N.M. RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION AUTH., http://www.nmreta.com (last
visited Apr. 11, 2012).
349. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-5-303(a) (2011).
350. Id. § 37-5-304(a)(iv)-(v).
351. N.D. CENT. CODE § 17-05-01 (2009).
352. Id. § 17-05-01(3).
353. Id. § 17-05-01(6).
354. Id. § 17-05-01(4).
355. Id. § 17-05-01(5); see also KEVIN PORTER & SARI FINK, NAT'L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., STATE TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE AUTHORITIES: THE STORY SO
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behind Idaho's transmission authority statute is based on reliability
issues, declaring that the "regional interconnection of electric
utilities" and the "restructuring of the electric industry in recent years
by the federal government" has "exposed ... Idaho ... to volatile

market prices [and] reliability concerns," 56 and that "the ability of.
utilities to provide reliable and economic electric services at stable
prices is essential to the economy and the economic development of
the state of Idaho and to the health, safety and welfare of its
people." 7 The statute grants the Energy Resources Authority the
power of eminent domain to address these issues.5 ' The Kansas
Electric Transmission Authority cites both reliability and economic
development as purposes for its authority.5 ' The legislature
acknowledged the importance of cooperating with neighboring states
in transmission planning by giving the Authority the power to
"participat[e] in and coordinat[e] with" the Southwest Power Pool
("SPP") RTO3 60 and the SPP Regional Reliability Organization. 36 1 It
also grants the Authority eminent domain power in order to carry out
its purpose.362
These developments show federal and state efforts to create
integrated regional electricity markets for renewable energy
development, grid reliability, and general economic development
purposes. All of these efforts require moving power across the
country through transmission lines in the interests of a broader
"public." The language used by the states to promote renewable
FAR 7 (2008), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43146.pdf

(explaining how the North
Dakota Transmission Authority can only "investigate, plan, prioritize, and propose
electric transmission corridors" and does not have the power of eminent domain).
356. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-8902(b) (2006).
357. Id. § 67-8902(a). The statute also recognizes that
[i]t is in the best interest of the state of Idaho and its people to encourage and
promote the development of renewable energy resources in order to develop
sustainable sources of energy supply, reduce inefficiencies in the use of electric
energy and enhance the long-term stability of the energy resources and
requirements of the state.
Id. § 67-8902(g).
358. Id. § 67-8908(g).
359. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-99d01 (Supp. 2011) ("The purpose for which the Kansas
electric transmission authority is created is to further ensure reliable operation of the
integrated electrical transmission system, diversify and expand the Kansas economy and
facilitate the consumption of Kansas energy through improvements in the state's electric
transmission infrastructure.").
360. Id § 74-99d07(a)(15).
361. Id. §74-99d07(a)(16).
362. Id. § 74-99d08(b).
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energy and grant eminent domain authority focuses on developing
state resources, expanding state economies, and benefiting the public
good through economic growth and environmental protection. 6
Differences among the states, however, may hinder these goals.
First, a state with a broad public purpose approach to eminent
domain for transmission lines may be stymied in its efforts to export
its resources if it neighbors a state with a narrower "use by the
public" approach. Likewise, it may be more difficult for a state
wishing to attract new lines to export renewable energy to accomplish
its goals if a neighboring state between the exporting state and the
load center will not grant eminent domain authority to lines designed
primarily to deliver electricity to out-of-state users.3 * Moreover, to
the extent states continue to narrow their definitions of "public use"
in response to Kelo, they may intentionally or inadvertently limit
eminent domain authority for some interstate transmission lines as
part of that reform unless, as some states have done, they expressly
carve out an exception for transmission lines in general. 6 s For
example, Indiana's statute defines public use as, among other things,
the "use of a parcel of real property to create or operate a public
utility" or "an energy utility," 36 6 but it excludes "the public benefit of
363. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 17-05-01(4) (2009) (declaring that transmission
constraints present an obstacle to realizing the economic benefits of the state's energy
resources); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-5-303(a) (2011) (stating that the purpose of the
Wyoming Infrastructure Authority is to "diversify and expand the Wyoming economy");
N.M. RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION AUTH., supra note 348 (citing job creation as
a goal of the New Mexico Renewable Energy Transmission Authority).
364. For example, New Mexico is striving to become a renewable energy exporter. See
N.M. RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION AUTH., supra note 348. However,
neighboring Arizona has taken a more parochial stance on interstate transmission lines,
which could block New Mexico from the crucial Southern California market. See
Vaheesan, supra note 340, at 116 ("Southern California Edison's unsuccessful attempt to
build a 230-mile transmission line from Palo Verde, Arizona to Devers, California
exemplifies the impact of parochialism among state regulators.").
365. See generally LARRY MORANDI, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
EMINENT
DOMAIN
LEGISLATION:
POST-KELO UPDATE
(Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/natres/EminentDomainPost-Kelo.pdf (describing broad
trends and categories of state legislative responses to Kelo, including barring eminent
domain takings solely for economic development purposes, limiting Kelo's applicability to
blighted areas, restricting the definition of "public use," increasing compensation
requirements, and increasing public notice requirements). For a more detailed state-bystate analysis, see Larry Morandi, State Eminent Domain Legislation and Ballot Measures,
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/env-res/eminent-domain-legislation-and-ballot-measures.aspx.
See also supra
notes 89-90 (discussing laws in Pennsylvania and Mississippi that restrict eminent domain
but carve out exceptions for transmission lines and other enumerated infrastructure
projects).
366. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-1(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
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economic development" from the definition of public use, 67 which
may create ambiguity. Likewise, post-Kelo reforms in Wyoming
limiting eminent domain to "possession, occupation and enjoyment of
the land by a public entity" also state that "nothing in this section
shall restrict or impair the right or authority of ... the Wyoming

infrastructure authority to transfer property condemned by the
authority to another public or private entity." 6 ' Ironically, the more
the promoters of interstate transmission for renewable energy tout
the "public benefits" of such lines, the more they may ultimately
erode one of the bases for eminent domain authority by placing the
lines in the more controversial takings category post-Kelo.
Thus, the question of how to define the "public" in "public use"
remains central to the inquiry. There is some logic to the approach
taken by the courts in Mississippi and Florida that refused to grant
eminent domain authority to interstate lines serving out-of-state
residents. Normatively speaking, how much weight should a state
court give to the needs of out-of-state residents in determining state
eminent domain authority? Aren't such considerations beyond a
single state court's jurisdiction? Indeed, in both of those cases, the
courts cited jurisdictional challenges inherent in considering any
public use beyond state borders in support of their refusals to invoke
eminent domain on behalf of the utilities.' Even the North Dakota37 0
and Indiana3 ' courts, which did find a public use for such lines,

367. Id.
368. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2011).
369. See Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1967) ("The sovereign's
power of eminent domain, whether exercised by it or delegated to another, is limited to
the sphere of its control and within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. A state's power exists
only within its territorial limits for the use and benefit of the people within the state. Thus,
property in one state cannot be condemned for the sole purpose of serving a public use in
another state."); Miss. Power & Light v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 110 (Miss. 1984) (noting
that the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over "the intrastate
business and property of public utilities," but "the sale of electric power from Mississippi
Power & Light Co. to the Louisiana Power & Light Co. is an interstate sale" (citations
omitted)).
370. See Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 525 (N.D. 1976)
(concluding that under relevant North Dakota precedents, "the public benefit, while not
confined exclusively to the state authorizing the use of the power, is nonetheless
inextricably attached to the territorial limits of the state because the state's sovereignty is
so constrained" (citations omitted)).
371. See Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 423 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(rejecting landowners' jurisdictional argument by noting that Indiana's legislature and
supreme court had both previously indicated that in the context of eminent domain
takings by state utilities, the term "public" should be interpreted to include out-of-state
residents).
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acknowledged the jurisdictional question before rejecting it as an
obstacle based on the facts of each case.372
A contemporary example of this issue is a decision by Arizona
siting regulators in 2007 to block a transmission line that would have
transported electricity from a nuclear generating station west of
Phoenix to Southern California.7 In rejecting the transmission line,
the siting board "emphasiz[ed] the ostensible environmental costs the
line would impose on Arizona at the expense of California [and]
called the line a '230-mile extension cord.' Among the concerns stated
were environmental impacts on 'everything from native plants and
wildlife to viewshed and archeological sites.' "374 However, it is
possible that a court weighing those concerns against providing a
reliable electricity source to the growing population of Southern
California would find that the latter took priority over the former and
that those environmental concerns were not a legitimate state
interest.7 Moreover, in that case, there was some evidence that
regulators were acting with a discriminatory purpose, which would
render the decision per se invalid. One regulator declared, "I don't
want Arizona to become an energy farm for California. This project,

372. On the other hand, one might argue that the refusal to grant eminent domain
authority to an interstate transmission line violates the dormant commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution because the denial unduly burdens interstate electricity markets. Such a
claim, however, would have to address arguments by the state that the denial was based on
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons such as environmental, aesthetic, or land use
concerns associated with the line. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that laws that block imports or otherwise give
facial preference to in-state resources or goods at the expense of out-of-state goods are
facially discriminatory and violate the commerce clause); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that state laws that are facially neutral may violate the
dormant commerce clause if the burden imposed on interstate commerce is "clearly
excessive" in relation to the local benefits); see also Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 66-70 (2003) (discussing defenses to
dormant commerce clause claims based on state environmental protection grounds and
outcome of Supreme Court decisions).
373. See Rossi, supra note 20, at 1022.
374. Id. (quoting Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Regulators Reject "Extension
Cord for California": Commissioners Reject Palo Verde to Devers II Power Line (May 30,
2007), http://www.cc.state.az.us/divisionsladministration/news/Devers IIVote.pdf).
375. Indeed, the Supreme Court has a long history of invalidating state attempts to
protect environmental resources via laws that burden interstate commerce. See, e.g., Klein,
supra note 372, at 10 (citing Chief Justice Rehnquist's frustration at the majority's
decisions-in a series of cases striking down state landfill regulations-to protect
interstate trade in solid waste rather than a state's interest in preserving open space); see
also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979) (invalidating a state law that
prohibited the interstate sale of minnows in order to prevent the depletion of the
resource).
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if we approved it, would use our land, our air and our water to
provide electricity to California.""
To address such disputes, and assuming no fundamental shift in
regulatory siting authority from the states to the federal government,
state legislatures and state courts can address the issue more
effectively in several ways. First, state legislatures can amend their
state siting and eminent domain laws to make it clear whether general
economic benefits or regional benefits such as grid reliability will
support eminent domain authority for transmission lines. Many states
prefer to keep their statutory language general so that each
transmission line is considered on a case-by-case basis through the
siting process. States should recognize, however, that such uncertainty
may hinder the ability of the state to attract investment in interstate
lines, particularly in light of the frequent legal challenges to
transmission lines. This will likely be most important to states with
significant renewable resources, like North Dakota and Wyoming,
which rely heavily on exporting those resources for economic
development purposes."7 Second, to the extent states wish to retain
broad "public use" language in their eminent domain statutes without
designating all interstate lines as a per se public use, state legislatures
can enact statutes like those in New Mexico and Wyoming that
explain why the development of renewable energy and the expansion
of interstate transmission lines is a public purpose and public benefit
to the state. 7
2. Eminent Domain Parity for Merchant Lines
As discussed in Part III, legislatures and courts in some states
have addressed whether the broad, statutory eminent domain
authority for electric transmission projects in general should apply
equally to merchant lines. In most states, until electricity restructuring
in the 1990s, publicly regulated utilities had captive customers and
owned both generation and transmission assets.179 Thus, there was
376. Rossi, supra note 20, at 1022 (quoting Press Release, supra note 374).
377. See, e.g., Expanding Target Industries: Energy, N.D. DEP'T COM.,
http://www.business.nd.gov/target/energy/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (publicizing that
energy is North Dakota's third largest industry and that when its new renewable energy
projects come on line they will "have the capacity to produce 325 million gallons of
ethanol, 85 million gallons of biodiesel, and 2,500 megawatts of wind power").
378. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
379. See Daniel Win. Fessler & Cynthia McArthur Morelli, FranchiseModification and
ConstitutionalConfrontation:An Avoidable Crisis of Consumer Expectations and Investor
Trust, 44 S.D. L. REV. 552, 552 (1999) (recognizing that a consensus emerged at the
beginning of the 1900s that energy generation was best left to a monopoly).
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little room for merchant transmission companies.8 0 Now, however, as
a result of restructuring as well as the increasing need to transmit
renewable energy and other distant resources to load centers, there is
a developing market for merchant lines."' Accordingly, a growing
number of states are now forced to consider whether the same
eminent domain authority granted to publicly regulated utilities
should also apply to private lines.
As noted earlier, many states in the Interior West have a long
history of granting eminent domain authority to private industry to
develop state natural resources.38 2 Outside the Interior West,
however, that history of granting eminent domain authority to private
parties to develop natural resources is not nearly so prevalent-with
such delegations generally limited to highly regulated industries or
common carriers such as public utilities and railroads. Moreover,
even in those Interior West states with this history of granting broad,
private eminent domain authority, there are good arguments that the
exercise of such authority can result in abuses and harm. * In all
states, however, the legislature has authority to grant private
merchant companies eminent domain authority to build electric
transmission lines. Indeed, it would not appear difficult for a state to
justify such lines as a public use; the need to develop renewable or
other electricity resources, to increase grid reliability, or to otherwise
contribute to the state's economic welfare only begin the list of
possible reasons a legislature might cite.
However, even if eminent domain authority for merchant lines
can be legally justified, is it good public policy? Should we be
concerned with private lines exercising such authority? Certainly,
there is a concern throughout the country over the growing
privatization of historically public functions such as schools, prisons,
hospitals, police authority, and other public services. 8 Without direct
380. See id. at 560 (demonstrating how the barriers to transmission of electricity
reduced competition between utility owners).
381. See id. at 555 (discussing how the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
attacked the dominance of public utilities by opening utility facility ownership to
"qualified utilities").
382. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
383. See Klass, supra note 48, at 677-81 (discussing differences between Interior West
states and the rest of the country on the role of eminent domain and natural resource
development).
384. See id. at 681-85 (discussing current conflicts between coal-bed methane
development and landowners in the Interior West as well as the environmental harms
associated with such development).
385. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1394-95 (2003) (arguing that the push for privatization of public services involves a
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political accountability or an express mission to work in the public
interest, many of the safeguards that historically existed for these
services have faded away2? Moreover, government oversight of these
private entities is often lacking, sometimes resulting in inappropriate
or excessive government spending on services provided by the private
sector, decreased quality of service, or outright fraud on the public."
It is not clear, however, that the same concerns exist for
transmission lines, at least where adequate federal and state review
approval processes exist. Even private lines must receive FERC
approval to enter into contracts with electricity generators and
providers, which affords oversight of at least some aspects of the
financial viability of the line. 38 To the extent states have a certificate
"regime of mixed administration" with government providing funding and setting goals
but private individuals implementing the program); David A. Super, Privatization,Policy
Paralysis,and the Poor,96 CALIF. L. REv. 393, 467-69 (2008) (noting a significant trend in
privatizing government benefit programs and arguing that economic efficiency indicates
that the government should privatize some tasks but should not privatize to the extent that
it has in this area); Stephanie Chen, Larger Inmate PopulationIs Boon to Private Prisons,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2008, at A4 (recognizing that private prisons housed 7.4% of
nation's prisoners in 2007 and highlighting the construction of other private prisons); Paul
Krugman, Op-Ed., Prisons, Privatization, Patronage,N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, at A25
(using the privatization of halfway houses to identify and analyze the enhanced trend of
privatizing government programs).
386. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1229, 1260-61 (2003) (recognizing that accountability of
public-private ventures must go beyond keeping honest books and delivering what is
promised in order for private ventures to reflect society's values).
387. See Super, supra note 385, at 466; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. & U.S.
Dep't
of
Justice,
About
Fraud,
STOP
MEDICARE
FRAUD,
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013)
(identifying examples of Medicare fraud and laying out steps under the Affordable Care
Act and other statutes that the government is taking to curb Medicare fraud and its
attendant societal costs).
388. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845 (Aug. 21, 2011) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring that public utility transmission suppliers consider more costefficient and effective solutions for meeting regional transmission needs); Chinook Power
Transmission, LLC & Zephyr Power Transmission, LLC, 126 FERC $ 61,134, at 61,765,
61,769 (2009) (authorizing merchant lines Chinook and Zephyr to charge negotiated rates
on their proposed merchant transmission projects pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824d and 18
C.F.R. § 35, and laying out ten criteria that a merchant line must meet to be granted such
authorization); TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., 91 FERC 91
61,230, at 61,838-41 (2000) (granting
the first merchant transmission owner's application for negotiated rate authority and
instituting conditions to ensure that rates are just and reasonable); Werntz, supra note 7,
at 440-70 (describing the evolution of FERC's approach to evaluating proposals for
negotiated rate authority); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (authorizing FERC's
jurisdiction over "[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility
for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy"); 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)
(2012) (setting detailed procedures for approved independent system operators and RTOs
regarding tariffs, bids from aggregators of retail customers, and market monitoring),
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of need or siting process through their state PUCs, such review
processes provide additional oversight of the line's economics, as well
as a review of its potential environmental impacts. Of course, these
review processes have many flaws and can often result in lines being
built that are not economically justified or that have adverse
environmental impacts that outweigh the lines' benefits. 89 Yet it is
not at all clear that these concerns are more significant for private
lines than for those built by public utilities-particularly since both
kinds of lines are generally subject to the same state review of public
necessity and need."' Indeed, since merchant lines are not able to
recover their costs of construction and operation from ratepayers,
there may be less concern that unnecessary lines will be built. 91
Moreover, in recent orders, FERC has attempted to encourage
the development of new transmission lines by non-incumbent
providers (i.e., private transmission companies or others who do not
have a designated retail service territory) in order to meet regional
transmission needs.3 9 To accomplish this goal, FERC Order 1000
required each public utility transmission provider to remove any
amended by 77 Fed Reg. 26,674, 26,686 (May 7, 2012) and 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,541
(July 13, 2012); 18 C.F.R. § 35.47 (2012) (setting parameters for organized wholesale
electric market tariff provisions), amended by 77 Fed Reg. 26,674, 26,686 (May 7, 2012)
and 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,541 (July 13, 2012). See generally ENERGY & NATURAL RES.
MKT REGULATION COMM., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, in AM. BAR ASS'N, ENVIRONMENT,
ENERGY, AND RESOURCES LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2011, at 181 (2011) (explaining
that under Order No. 1000, proposed merchant lines must be evaluated in light of
openness requirements of Order No. 890).
389. See Rossi, supra note 20, at 1018-22 (reviewing the existing regulatory analysis of
public need and environmental impact and the ineffectiveness of such an analysis due to
the shifts in the industry).
390. See id.; supra Part II.A. Most states require both public utilities and non-utilities
to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity or equivalent approval prior to
exercising eminent domain for new transmission lines. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7520-113, 75-20-201 (2011). The exceptions are Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Louisiana, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See supra note 220.
391. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 150, at 749 ("[U]nless the line is being proposed by
a utility for inclusion in rate base ... it is difficult to see what is accomplished by requiring
a public adjudication of need.").
392. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,880 (Aug. 21, 2011) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 35) (enacting reforms that will "eliminate practices that have the potential
to undermine the identification and evaluation of more efficient or cost-effective
alternatives to regional transmission needs, which in turn can result in rates for
Commission-jurisdictional services that are unjust or unreasonable, or otherwise result in
undue discrimination by public utility transmission providers"); see also FERC Order
1000,

MIDWEST

INDEP.

TRANSMISSION

SERV.

OPERATOR,

INC.,

https://www.midwestiso.org/WhatWeDo/Strategiclnitiatives/Pages/FERCOrderlOOO.aspx
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (discussing provisions of FERC Order 1000 and arguing that
Order 1000 is "a major step forward in advancing transmission planning").
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federal right of first refusal from its FERC-approved tariffs and
agreements for a transmission facility. 393 Notably, there are
exceptions to the elimination of federal rights of first refusal for
certain transmission projects, and the rule has no impact on state laws
that may favor incumbent utilities.394 The rule's objective, however, is
to address discrimination in assigning new transmission projects that
favor incumbent utilities, often leading to higher costs and less
efficient transmission expansion. 39 5 The practical result of this rule is
to limit the "home-field" advantage incumbent transmission owners
currently have with regard to building new transmission lines and to
expand the opportunities for potential competitors, including
merchant lines.3 *
FERC Order 1000 is relevant to the question of eminent domain
for transmission lines because it identifies a market problem for new
transmission that may be partially ameliorated by creating a more
level playing field between public utilities and merchant lines when it
comes to eminent domain authority. Although the rule states
expressly that it does not affect state or local laws governing
transmission, there is a good policy argument that granting merchant
lines the same eminent domain authority for new transmission lines as
public utilities would promote the federal policy of minimizing
existing barriers for new entrants to the transmission market. Of
course, some states may not wish to promote a policy that increases
transmission lines at all. For instance, Delaware does not grant
eminent domain authority to any transmission lines, regardless of who
builds them.39 7 Other states, however, may wish to promote such lines
to facilitate participation in regional electricity markets. If so, creating

393. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,842.
394. See WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, ENERGY: FERC REFORMS TRANSMISSION
PLANNING AND COST ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 3 (2011), http://www.winston.com
/siteFiles/Publications/FERC_7_22_11.pdf.
395. See id.; see also Statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman of F.E.R.C., on Right of
First Refusal (ROFR) Orders (July 19, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar
JFiles/20120719164044-E-11-WELLINGHOFF.pdf.
396. See Statement of Jon Wellinghoff, supra note 395 (arguing that the rule against
rights of first refusal and the open and transparent transmission planning process will
ensure there is no undue discrimination between energy transmission providers). But see
WINSTON & STRAWN, supra note 394, at 3 (advising that the exclusions written into the
rule would extend the substantial advantage that incumbent transmission owners have
over transmission developers).
397. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 901, 906-908 (2009) (limiting eminent domain
powers of all electric transmission companies to former railroad rights-of-ways, public
roads, canals, and highways).
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a level playing field with regard to eminent domain authority is
consistent with that policy choice.
Overall, it is hard to justify treating merchant lines differently
from utility-owned lines for eminent domain purposes. 98 At that
level, the question is then whether the benefits of facilitating new
lines for renewable energy development, grid reliability, or reduced
costs"' outweigh the potential environmental impacts and other
harms or costs associated with new lines. This would appear to be a
policy question each state may decide for itself, based on state and
regional energy development and grid reliability goals, rather than
based on any principles inherent in eminent domain doctrine.
This, of course, leads to a patchwork of eminent domain
authority across the country for merchant lines, which creates a
problem for the development of new, interstate lines to develop
renewable energy resources and maintain grid reliability. There will
likely be a growing number of instances where the economics support
development of a new, interstate merchant line but unfriendly
eminent domain policies in certain states may make construction
more difficult. One can argue that in the case of a private line, it is
incumbent on the line developer to simply pay its way through
398. For arguments in favor of eminent domain authority for private development of
renewable energy, including the renewable energy facilities themselves, see generally
Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables
Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827 (2011) (explaining the need for "utility-scale
renewable development" in creating a sustainable energy policy and addressing the gaps in
the current law that stifle this development).
399. Increasing transmission capacity in areas like the Northeast has the potential to
significantly reduce electricity costs, as the increased transmission capacity provides access
to less expensive renewable and non-renewable energy sources in low-density areas
outside transmission-constrained regions like New York City. See SUSAN F. TIERNEY ET
AL., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FUEL DIVERSITY IN THE NEW YORK ELECTRICITY
(2008),
http://www.nyiso.com/publiclwebdocs/newsroom/white
MARKET
4-9
papers/fuel diversity_11202008.pdf (explaining that introducing additional wind power
into the New York City market could reduce energy prices by roughly ten percent); see
also BOB FAGAN ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON, INC., THE POTENTIAL RATE EFFECTS
OF WIND ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION IN THE MIDWEST ISO REGION 3 (2012),
http://cleanenergytransmission.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Full-Report-ThePotential-Rate-Effects-of-Wind-Energy-and-Transmission-in-the-Midwest-ISORegion.pdf (explaining that increasing transmission capacity for wind resources will
reduce the market price of electricity for Midwest consumers); I.S.O. NEW ENGLAND,
(2006),
http://www.isoCOSTS
WHITE
PAPER
3
INC.,
ELECTRICITY
ne.com/pubs/whtpprs/elec-costs-wht-ppr.pdf (arguing that increasing energy supply from
low cost sources (e.g. wind) could save New England consumers $600 million per year);
Johannes Pfeifenberger & Delphine Hou, Transmission's True Value, PUB. UTILS.
FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 2012, at 47 (explaining that limited liquidity of electricity markets
results in higher prices and decreased reliability, and that increasing transmission capacity
increases liquidity).
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voluntary contracts with landowners without the threat of eminent
domain authority. However, the fact remains that if states wish to
develop their renewable energy resources and transmit those
resources to out-of-state load centers, and those load centers wish to
receive the energy, those states may wish to consider any current
obstacles to eminent domain authority for private lines. The other
approach, as noted earlier in the discussion of interstate lines, is to
create federal eminent domain authority for transmission lines similar
to what exists for interstate natural gas pipelines. 0 Federal
legislation could expressly grant eminent domain authority to any
merchant line that obtains a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for an interstate line from FERC.40
To the extent the law continues to develop on a state-by-state
basis for intrastate lines, interstate lines, or both, states that wish to
attract investment in merchant lines may choose to amend their
existing eminent domain statutes to expressly grant eminent domain
authority to merchant lines. As discussed in Part III.B, a few states
like Montana have recently amended their statutes to expressly grant
eminent domain authority to merchant lines.402 Other states, like
Wyoming, with broad grants of eminent domain authority to
transmission lines generally, have court decisions confirming that
such authority also applies to merchant lines. 0 In many other states,
however, the statutes are unclear and no case law exists interpreting
them.4 0 For the states that fall into this category, if they wish to be
more hospitable to such lines, they should enact legislation clarifying
that private companies have the same eminent domain authority to
build transmission lines as public utilities after receiving all necessary
state approvals. Again, as a policy matter, many states may not wish
to grant such authority to merchant lines, choosing instead to limit the
use of eminent domain to more highly regulated public utilities.
Indeed, some states, like Nebraska, have enacted such limitations
expressly.40 5 Still, the bulk of the states have laws that are unclear on
400. See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
402. See Act of May 9, 2011, ch. 321, § 2, 2011 Mont. Laws 1320, 1320 (codified at
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 75-20-113 (2011)); MATL LLP v. Salois, 2011 MT 126, 6, 360
Mont. 510, 512, 255 P.3d 158, 160 (reversing the district court for not applying the newly
codified eminent domain authority).
403. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815(a) (2011); Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec.
Power Co-op., 2005 WY 108, 1 23, 118 P.3d 996,998,1003 (Wyo. 2005).
404. See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
405. See Act of April 12, 2010, §§ 6, 9, 2010 Neb. Laws 773, 775-78, 779-80 (codified as
amended in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 70-1014.02, 76-710.04 (Supp. 2011)); Sen. Deb Fisher, LB
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the subject, and more clarity in this area would undoubtedly aid in
planning and decision-making for both regulators and the regulated
community. Creating consistency between state energy policy and
eminent domain law by statute and, if necessary, judicial decision will
go a long way toward creating a more hospitable environment for
merchant lines specifically and for expanding the transmission grid to
facilitate increased renewable energy deployment and reliability more
generally.
CONCLUSION

This is a critical time in the development of interstate electricity
transmission in the United States. As regulatory policy attempts to
encourage the development of renewable energy and create regional
electricity markets, there are significant questions surrounding
whether the nation's state-based system of transmission siting is up to
the task of facilitating the necessary developments in the electricity
grid. As this Article shows, eminent domain law has always played a
central role in the building of transmission lines. Now, however, as
merchant transmission companies become more significant players in
the field and it becomes increasingly necessary to build interstate
transmission lines to integrate these resources into the grid, it is
apparent that the patchwork of eminent domain law for transmission
lines among the states is a potential barrier to meeting policy goals
regarding grid reliability, cost reduction, and renewable energy
integration. This Article explores these challenges, particularly in
light of the backlash to Kelo, and suggests various paths states can
follow to ensure their eminent domain laws are consistent with their
policy preferences on energy development and export.

1048 Clarifies Wind Power Development in Nebraska, SANDHILLS EXPRESS (Mar. 19,
2010, 2:55 PM), http://www.sandhillsexpress.com/BuySell/BuySellDetails/tabid/108/smid
/384/ArticlelD/1500/Default.aspx. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-301 (2009) (laying
out the general law of eminent domain in Nebraska).
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A

The following states have statutes that generally confer eminent
domain authority to "power companies," companies engaged in
"transmission of electricity," "utilities," or similar entities, and define
these terms broadly enough that merchant transmission lines might be
included, but no case law or administrative law firmly suggests they
will or will not grant eminent domain authority to a merchant
transmission line. For states that more clearly do or do not grant
eminent domain authority to merchant lines, see supra notes 266-75
and accompanying text.
* Statutes and case law suggest a stronger likelihood that eminent
domain authority would be granted.
t Statutes and case law suggest a weaker likelihood that eminent
domain authority would granted.
Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 1OA-21-2.01, 1OA-21-2.04 (2010); id. § 181B-2 (2007); id. § 37-4-130 (1992).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(a)-(b) (2010).
Arizona*: ARIZ. CONST. art. XV, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 121111(a)(10), 12-1115(c) (2003); Sw. Transmission Coop., Inc. v. Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n, 142 P.3d 1240, 1243-47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
that a transmission co-op that only provided electric power at
wholesale to other utilities was defined as a "public service
corporation," even though it did not provide power directly to the
public, suggesting a flexible definition of "public service
corporation").
Californiat: CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 216(e), 217, 218(b)(3), 610, 612
(West 2004 & Supp. 2013). The California Public Utilities Code
appears to restrict the use of eminent domain by corporations. See
California Law Revision Commission, Comment on Sec. 610 of the
California Public Utilities Code (1975) ("Section 610 is included to
make clear that this article extends the right of eminent domain only
to 'public utilities' . . . and not to persons or corporations that are not

subject to regulation and rate control."). However, the Code
continues to use a broad definition of "public utility." See CAL. PUB.
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UTIL. CODE § 216(c) (West 2004) (defining public utility as "any
person or corporation" that delivers "any commodity to" an entity
that serves the public).
Colorado*: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-12-125, 38-1-101(1), 38-1-103, 381-105, 38-1-202(2)(e), 38-1-202(2)(1), 40-1-103(2)(a) (2012); see id.
§ 38-2-101 ("If any corporation formed for the purpose of
constructing [an] electric line ... is unable to agree with the owner for
the purchase of any real estate or right-of-way or easement or other
right necessary or required for the purpose of any such corporation
for transacting its business or for any lawful purpose connected with
the operations of the company, the corporation may acquire title to
such real estate or right-of-way or easement or other right in the
manner provided by law for the condemnation of real estate or rightof-way.").
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-160, 22-3-160.1, 22-3-161 (Supp.
2012).
Hawaiit: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 101-4 (LexisNexis 2006); id.§ 2691 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2011) (amended by Act of June 27, 2012,
2012 HAW. SESS. LAWS 584,590).
Idaho*: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701(11) (2010); see also H.B. 268, 61st
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2011) (failed 2011 legislation that would
have required entities other than public utilities to prove a proposed
taking was in the interest of Idaho citizens, strongly suggesting nonutility transmission companies currently have an unencumbered right
of eminent domain).
Indiana*: IND. CODE ANN. H§ 8-1-2-1(b)(1), 8-1-8-1(a)(2) (LexisNexis
1998 & Supp. 2012); AEP Ind. Mich. Transmission Co., Cause No.
44000, 2011 WL 5505445, at *11, *13 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n
Nov. 2, 2011), available at https://myweb.in.gov/IURC/eds/Modules
/Ecms/Cases/DocketedCases/ViewDocument.aspx?DocD=0900b63
18017c616 (granting eminent domain powers to an independent
transmission company, which it deemed a "transmission only public
utility").
Iowa*: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 478.1(1), 478.6, 478.15 (West 2009)

(grant of franchise by the Utilities Board to "any person, company, or
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corporation" for the operation of transmission lines vests in that
entity the right to exercise eminent domain "to such extent as the
board may approve and find necessary for public use"); ITC Midwest
LLC, No. E-21948, 2011 WL 3796221, at *1 (Iowa Util. Bd. Aug. 24,
2011).
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2 (2004 & Supp. 2013).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 3131(1)-(3), 3136(1)-(2) (2010).
Massachusetts*: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 164, § 1 (LexisNexis 2002 &
Supp. 2012); id. §§ 69G, 69R (LexisNexis 2002); id. § 72(a)
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2012) (noting that in addition to granting
broad authority to "electric companies," the Department of Public
Utilities may authorize a "transmission company" to use eminent
domain).
Minnesotat: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216E.01(1), 216E.12(1) (West
2010); id. § 117.189 (West Supp. 2013); In re Prairie Rose
Transmission, LLC, No. IP-6838/TL-10-134, 2012 WL 258025 (Minn.
Pub.
Util.
Comm'n,
Jan.
13,
2012),
available at
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.
do?method=showPoup&documentld={EE2F8171-D509-41B8-8B85BDA605E2AF29)&documentTitle=20121-70271-01
(granting
a
CPCN for a private transmission project that would connect Prairie
Rose Wind Farm to the grid, and noting that Prairie Rose
Transmission would not have eminent domain authority, but failing to
explain why or whether it had sought eminent domain authority).
Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-27-47 (West 2008); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 386.020(14)-(15) (West 2010); id.
§ 523.010(1) (West 2002); State ex rel. Harline v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of Mo., 343 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
Nevadat: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.010 (LexisNexis 2012); id.
§ 704.020(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2009); id. § 704.021 (LexisNexis 2009 &
Supp. 2011) (noting that persons who produce and sell energy to
public utilities are not themselves public utilities).

1158

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:2-13, 48:3-17.6 (West 2009).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40A-3(a), 62-183, 62-185 (2011)
(private persons and corporations may use eminent domain for
"public use or benefit," for purposes including "electric power lines,
electric lights"); Duke Power Co. v. Ribet, 25 N.C. App. 87, 89, 212
S.E.2d 182, 183 (1975) ("Where an agency has the power of
condemnation, the choice of route is primarily in its discretion and
will not be reviewed ... unless it appears that there has been an abuse
of discretion.").
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-02(4) (2010); id. § 49-22-03
(1999 & Supp. 2011); id. §49-22-07 (1999); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
Demchuk, 314 N.W.2d 298, 301 (N.D. 1982).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.15 (LexisNexis 2000); Ohio
Power Co. v. Diller, 247 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969)
(describing the broad and discretionary nature of the legislature's
grant of authority to electric companies).
Pennsylvaniat: 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1511(a)(3), 1511(c)
(West 1995); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 203(b)(1), 204(b)(2)(i)
(West 2009); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (West 2000 & Supp.
2012) (defining a "public utility" as any person or corporation that
owns facilities in the state for "transmitting . . . electricity . . . for the

production of light, heat, or power to or for the public for
compensation" (emphasis added)).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-130 (1977).
South Dakota*: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-35-1, 21-35-1.1, 49-34-4
(2004); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Payne, 298 N.W.2d 385, 386 (S.D.
1980) (in which the South Dakota Supreme Court expressed no
reservations about construing "utility" so broadly as to include an
electric co-operative for purposes of eminent domain authority).
Tennessee*: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-39-102(3), 7-39-201, 7-39303(a)(4) (2011) (granting eminent domain rights to "energy
acquisition corporations" that transmit and distribute energy); id.
§ 65-22-101 (2004); Webb v. Knox Cnty. Transmission Co., 225 S.W.
1046, 1046-48, 1050-51 (Tenn. 1920) (affirming the eminent domain
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rights of a private company that served only to transmit electricity
from an unaffiliated generation facility to a public service
corporation, but prior to the enactment of relevant modern statutes).
Tennessee courts upheld Webb in 1951 and 1990, after the enactment
of applicable statutes, suggesting the lasting impact of this common
law rule. See Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Batey, No. 89233-II, 1990 WL 6383, at * 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).
Texas*: TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 181.004 (West 2007); Motion for
Issuance of Interim Orders, Complaint of Richard D. Bass Family
Against Lone Star Transmission, LLC (No. 39,902), 2011 WL 5890724
(Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 16, 2011); Joint Response of Electric
Transmission Texas, LLC and Staff to Order No. 4, Application of
Electric Transmission Texas LLC (No. 39,902), 2009 WL 3698814, at
Attachment A (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n Aug. 26, 2009) (revised
notice from private transmission developer ETT to landowners
informing them ETT has the power of eminent domain under Texas
law).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. H§ 78B-6-501(8), 78B-6-505 (LexisNexis
2008 & Supp. 2012).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1, 56-49(2), 56-265.1(b) (2012).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.32.060, 80.32.080,
80.32.090 (West 2001); State ex rel. Woodruff v. Superior Court, 259
P. 379, 380 (Wash. 1927).
West Virginia*: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-1-1, 54-1-2(a)(2)
(LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE R. §§ 53-3-1 to 53-3-10 (2012);
Potomac Edison Co. v. Jefferson Cnty. Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
512 S.E.2d 576, 580 (W. Va. 1998) (affirming right of "privatelyowned power companies to take or damage private property for
specified public uses"); Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147, 148-49 (W.
Va. 1979) (affirming the right of a privately-owned power company to
exercise the power of eminent domain); In re Trans-Allegheny
Interstate Line Co., 267 PUR 4th (PUR, Inc.) 169, 261-62 (W. Va.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 1, 2008) (supporting the eminent domain
rights of an independent transmission company that charges costbased rates), order rescinded in part In re Trans-Allegheny Interstate
Line Co., No. 07-0508-E-CN, 2009 WL 3517729 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
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Comm'n Feb. 13,2009); Firstenergy Corp. Allegheny Energy, Inc, 133
FERC 61,222, at 62,186 (2010); Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line
Co., 119 FERC 1 61,219, at 62,280 (2007).

Wyoming*: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815(a) (2011); Bridle Bit Ranch
Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 2005 WY 108, 1 1-3, 12, 118 P.3d
996, 998, 1003 (Wyo. 2005) (holding that a wholesale electric
generation and transmission cooperative was not a public utility, and
therefore did not need a certificate of public necessity and
convenience, but that it exercise eminent domain regardless).

